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The Professional Prospectus: A Call for 
Effective Professional Disclosure 
Benjamin P. Edwards* 
Abstract 
Without easy access to relevant information, many consumers 
unwittingly trust serious decisions to professionals with histories of 
malpractice and negligence—leading to both individual and 
societal harms. This Article proposes to improve professional 
services markets with a tool that has already proven effective in the 
securities markets: a prospectus. A “Professional Prospectus” would 
reduce information asymmetries and improve the market for 
professional services through disclosure and consumer choice.  
A Professional Prospectus would alter the market for 
professional services by making professional reputation a more 
potent force. Economic theory often relies on “reputation effects” to 
ensure the efficient functioning of the market without providing for 
mechanisms to efficiently broadcast reputation. Tailored 
disclosures delivered through a Professional Prospectus would put 
existing public information into consumer hands, allowing the 
market to more efficiently price professional services. This would 
discipline and deter professional misconduct and reward 
higher-quality service providers.  
To showcase a feasible Professional Prospectus intervention, 
this Article presents an initial use case demonstrating how a 
mandatory disclosure intervention could improve the market for 
immigration law services. The principles developed in this Article 
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may also improve private and social outcomes in other markets for 
professional services. 
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I. Introduction 
THERE ARE IDIOTS. Look around. 
—Lawrence H. Summers, Former Secretary of the Treasury1 
No doubt the same may be said of all professions. They are all 
conspiracies against the laity. 
—George Bernard Shaw, Author2 
Like many others before him, Celso Lima Mejia learned the 
hard way that a professional license does not guarantee basic 
competence.3 After Guatemalan rebels kidnapped Mr. Mejia 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Paul Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Sept. 2, 2009 (“Lawrence Summers once began a paper on finance by 
declaring: ‘THERE ARE IDIOTS. Look around.’”). 
 2. GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, THE DOCTOR’S DILEMMA, at xv (1906). 
 3. See Gary Rivlin, Dollars and Dreams: Immigrants as Prey, N.Y. TIMES, 
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during the country’s civil war, he fled to the United States with his 
family.4 Mejia paid attorney Miguel Gadda thousands of dollars for 
assistance with an asylum claim.5 Although he had hoped for a 
green card, Mr. Mejia received a deportation order instead.6  
Consumers often lack useful information about professionals 
before they hire them.7 When Mejia hired Gadda on a family 
friend’s recommendation,8 he probably did not know that the 
California State Bar had previously suspended Gadda for 
misconduct in 1990.9 When it removed Gadda from practice for the 
second time, the California State Bar found that “at least six” 
courts had reviewed Gadda’s work and declared that his clients 
had received “ineffective assistance of counsel.”10 This is no small 
finding. The ineffective assistance of counsel standard requires 
that representation be “so poor that it affected the fundamental 
rights of the client and the client’s right to due process.”11  
Current markets for professional services often function 
poorly and fail to ensure competent services.12 Backward-looking 
consumer protection through malpractice liability and public 
discipline often fails to protect consumers because professionals 
rarely internalize malpractice’s true cost.13 The private 
                                                                                                     
June 11, 2006, at BU1 [hereinafter Dollars and Dreams] (discussing unethical 
attorneys who take advantage of immigrants). 
 4. See id. (same). 
 5. See id. (same). 
 6. See id. (same). Another lawyer later obtained relief for Mr. Mejia even 
though Mr. Gadda had “made such a mess out of the asylum claim.” See id. 
(quoting attorney Ilyce Shugall). 
 7. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 753  
(“It may be impossible for clients to determine in advance which lawyers present 
the highest risks.”). 
 8. See Dollars and Dreams, supra note 3 (discussing Mr. Mejia’s case). 
 9. See In re Miguel Gadda, 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 416, 2002 WL 
31012596, at *1 (Rev. Dep’t State Bar Ct. of Cal. 2002) (explaining that Mr. Gadda 
was “previously disciplined . . . in 1990”). 
 10. Id. at *32. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why 
Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the 
Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1272 (1995) (“Many commentators have observed 
that the legal profession is not particularly effective at ensuring that lawyers 
provide honest or competent representation.”). 
 13. See Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession’s Dirty Little 
Secret, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1657, 1695 (1994) (observing that the goals in responding 
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immigration bar serves as an example because it is notorious for 
its “uneven quality.”14 One immigration judge explained that “all 
too often the representation [in immigration court] is mediocre,” 
and that “many attorneys are just not very interested in their work 
and therefore bring little professional vigor or focus to it.”15 
Immigration courts may see more substandard practice because 
ex-post liability feedback mechanisms rarely function.16 Consider 
the tremendous hurdles faced by Mr. Gadda’s deported clients. 
Their deportations frustrate their abilities to bring malpractice 
actions or file disciplinary complaints.17  
The public frequently faces a lemon problem when seeking to 
hire a professional.18 While Mr. Mejia encountered a lemon lawyer, 
lemons also lurk in the markets for doctors, financial advisers, 
accountants, and other professionals.19 If customers struggle to 
locate high-quality services, the best professionals cannot reap 
rewards for providing premium quality—leading them to either 
exit the market or offer lower-quality services.20 
                                                                                                     
to malpractice—“protecting the public, deterring future misconduct, and 
rehabilitating offenders”—are admirable, but that the systems by which to 
achieve them are “highly ineffective”). In any event, overall malpractice claims 
continue to rise. See Melissa Mortazavi, A No-Fault Remedy for Legal 
Malpractice?, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 471, 471 (2015) (“The last forty years have seen 
a marked rise in legal malpractice lawsuits.”). 
 14. See Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the 
Need for New Narratives in the U.S. Immigration System, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
207, 247 (2012) (“The uneven quality of the immigration bar has been long noted 
as the level of skill and knowledge of immigration law varies significantly.”). 
 15. Noel Brennan, A View from the Immigration Bench, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
623, 626 (2009). 
 16. For a discussion of substandard practice in immigration courts, see infra 
notes 221–239 and accompanying text. 
 17. For a discussion of immigration court problems, see infra Part II. 
 18. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970) [hereinafter Akerlof, 
Lemons] (explaining that buyers possess imperfect information when purchasing 
a car because they do not know whether the car “will be good or a lemon”). 
 19. See Professional Negligence Claims, PAUL & PERKINS PA, 
http://paulandperkins.com/medical-malpractice-attorneys/professional-
negligence-claims/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (listing professionals against 
whom malpractice claims may be filed) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 20. See Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should 
Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1115–16 
(2014) (“If consumers cannot distinguish between good and bad professional 
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Occupational licensing systems claim to mitigate these 
problems by requiring persons to meet minimum standards before 
joining a profession.21 The empirical evidence does not always 
support this claim.22 While some studies find a modest increase in 
quality from occupational licensing structures, others find that 
occupational licensing drives up costs for consumers while offering 
no increase in the quality of services (and in some cases results in 
lower-quality services).23 
Consumers also receive little protection on the other side of 
the licensing barrier to entry. Self-regulating professions and 
occupational licensing bodies often fail to protect consumers 
because they tend to act like cartels—behaving more in the 
interests of their members than of the public.24 These bodies move 
ponderously when responding to complaints and allow problems to 
linger in lax enforcement cultures.25 
Much of the problem stems from information asymmetry 
between professional service providers and the public.26 
                                                                                                     
service, the high-quality, high-price providers will not be able to attract even 
those customers who both want and can pay for better quality service.”). 
 21. See Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, 14 J. ECON. PERSPS. 189, 
191 (2000) (describing occupational licensing as a “process where entry into an 
occupation requires the permission of the government, and the state requires 
some demonstration of a minimum degree of competency”). 
 22. See CAROLYN COX & SUSAN FOSTER, BUREAU OF ECONS. FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION 21–27, 40 
(1990), http://www.ramblemuse.com/articles/cox_foster.pdf (“The empirical 
findings indicate that mandatory entry requirements of licensing cannot 
necessarily be relied upon to raise the quality of service.”). 
 23. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 20, at 1116–17 (collecting research on 
professional licensing). 
 24. See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming A Fifth 
Branch, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11 (2013) (“Self-regulation is easily justified if it 
protects investors and maximizes social welfare but may not be if it is used merely 
to transfer wealth from investors to brokers. This ‘cartelization’ problem is 
present in almost every area of broker-dealer regulation.”). 
 25. See Benjamin P. Edwards, The Dark Side of Self-Regulation, 85 U. CINN. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 39) (“While traditional regulatory 
agencies may also be prone to inaction, self-regulatory bodies may be particularly 
lethargic protectors . . . .”); see also Robert W. Gordon, Portrait of A Profession in 
Paralysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1427, 1431 (2002) (“In most states [the bar] does not 
finance or staff more than a tiny fraction of the administrative machinery that 
would be needed to handle client complaints effectively or more pro-actively 
investigate systemic abuses and engage in rulemaking.”). 
 26. Cf. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 753 (“It is hard for clients to shop for the 
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Professionals know whether they carry insurance, have had 
disciplinary complaints or sanctions, and whether they have been 
sued for malpractice. While a sophisticated patient or client might 
uncover some of this information through due diligence processes, 
most people may not even know where to begin.27 
This problem has been solved before.28 Under the federal 
securities laws, public companies must disclose information to the 
public at regular intervals.29 This disclosure reduces the 
information asymmetry between investors and management, 
giving the more efficient securities markets an opportunity to 
fairly price securities. In the primary market, it also gives 
investors enough credible information to make decisions about 
whether to buy securities directly from the issuer. 
A similar type of intervention could dramatically improve the 
market for professional services and help solve the professional 
lemon problem—leading to increased demand for professional 
services.30 A “Professional Prospectus” regime—a disclosure 
system that pushed short, salient, and relevant information to 
consumers—would enable the market for professional services to 
function more efficiently. For the regime to function, it would 
require carefully designed, concise, and useful information to reach 
consumers.31 If a Professional Prospectus regime succeeded 
completely, it could allow market forces to separate the mediocre 
                                                                                                     
most skilled and trustworthy lawyer because as non-experts they may not be able 
to accurately judge the quality of the lawyer’s services even long after they are 
rendered.”). 
 27. See id. (discussing the “asymmetry of information between lawyers and 
clients”). 
 28. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for A 
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 722 (1984) (“[B]ecause 
information has many characteristics of a public good, securities research tends 
to be underprovided . . . . A mandatory disclosure system can . . . improve the 
allocative efficiency of the capital market—and this improvement in turn implies 
a more productive economy.”). 
 29. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., HILLARY A. SALE & M. TODD HENDERSON, 
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 7 (13th ed. 2015) (“In short, for 
the securities market to function efficiently, much more disclosure is required 
than in most other markets.”). 
 30. Cf. Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing Legal Education, 45 CONN. L. 
REV. 1281, 1284 (2013) (“The untapped market for legal services is potentially 
worth billions of dollars.”). 
 31. See infra Part II (discussing the design of a disclosure system). 
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from the masterful—allowing more competent professionals to 
reap appropriate rewards. At the least, it would bring market 
forces to bear and drive the most deficient out. A well-functioning 
disclosure regime would also give professionals real incentives to 
improve the services they provide. By increasing confidence in 
individual service providers, it would also likely expand markets 
for professional services.32 
Some members of the learned professions will surely object to 
a standardized disclosure structure’s inherent commodification 
and airing of unflattering facts. A Professional Prospectus regime 
will make many current stakeholders uncomfortable. It will 
require real, dirt-dropping dossiers to make it into consumer 
hands. Professionals will be forced into countless awkward 
conversations to address consumer concerns. Because 
self-regulatory organizations and licensing bodies seemingly value 
protecting their members more than the public, they may balk at 
broadly liberating and disseminating information about 
professionals.33 
Mandatory disclosure systems can mitigate market failures 
driven by information asymmetry.34 Securities regulation focused 
on creating efficient securities markets provides a rough model for 
a Professional Prospectus system.35 A well-functioning system for 
the professional services markets, however, would look different 
than the disclosure regime for the public securities markets. It 
would focus on delivering small amounts of material information 
and not bury consumers in papers.36 
                                                                                                     
 32. See Knake, supra note 30, at 1284 (discussing limitations on the legal 
market). 
 33. See Linda Morton, Finding the Suitable Lawyer: Why Consumers Can’t 
Always Get What They Want and What the Legal Profession Should Do About It, 
25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 287 (1992) (“Unfortunately, a marked disparity exists 
between the type of information consumers want and the type the legal profession 
thinks they should have.”). 
 34. See Coffee, supra note 28, at 722 (discussing the effect of mandatory 
disclosure systems on economic markets). 
 35. Cf. Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of 
Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 714 (2006) (“The main thesis of this 
Article posits that the role of securities regulation is to create and promote a 
competitive market for information traders.”). 
 36. For example, it would make little sense to require all professionals to 
undergo annual audits. The high cost of producing that information would swamp 
the benefits. Besides, most consumers will not wade through voluminous piles of 
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A Professional Prospectus regime would embody a few key 
characteristics.37 Instead of expecting uninformed members of the 
public to know how to perform rudimentary due diligence, it would 
push essential information, much of which is already available to 
those who already know where to look, out to consumers.38 To 
reach consumers at a time when they may still be shopping around, 
a Professional Prospectus should, whenever possible, be delivered 
before any agreement to perform professional services can be 
made.39 To increase the chance that the public reads and 
understands the information, it should be concise and delivered 
with relevant contextual information.40 
This Article is the first to call for a prospectus-type system to 
push information to consumers in the markets for professional 
services. The problem has been considered from different angles. 
Some have argued that lawyers should be allowed to advertise.41 
Others have critiqued the current occupational licensing 
structure42 and considered the economic rationales for lawyer 
regulations.43 This Article goes further and calls for a meaningful 
disclosure system for professionals in different professional 
services markets. 
                                                                                                     
paper before hiring a professional. As discussed in Part II below, an effective 
Professional Prospectus will need to be brief. Public investors will only rarely 
crack open the voluminous prospectuses and annual reports released by public 
companies. See Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities 
Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 18 (noting that “most public investors are 
unlikely to actually read and grasp the stylized prospectus”). 
 37. See infra Part II (fleshing out the characteristics of a Professional 
Prospectus). 
 38. See infra Part II (same). 
 39. See infra Part II (same). 
 40. See infra Part II (same). 
 41. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to 
Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1087 
(1983) (“The Article applies basic market and economic theory to the production 
and consumption of legal services and demonstrates that lawyer advertising 
offers important advantages to consumers of legal services.”). 
 42. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 20, at 1115–16 (noting the difficulty 
consumers face in evaluating the quality of professional services). 
 43. See Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An 
Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 431–32 (2001) (“For example, no one has comprehensively 
addressed the underlying justifications for the regulations we have, and whether 
the regulations are satisfying those justifications.”). 
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews the failed 
markets for professional services and considers the weaknesses in 
current occupational licensing structures and the limited role 
reputation currently plays in the markets for professional 
services.44 Part II fleshes out the Professional Prospectus concept 
and describes key considerations for crafting useful disclosures.45 
To illustrate how a Professional Prospectus system might 
immediately improve markets, Part II also proposes implementing 
a Professional Prospectus system immediately for attorneys 
practicing in federal immigration courts.46 Part III discusses 
possible objections and the outcomes likely to flow from an 
improved disclosure regime.47 
While this Article proposes near-term implementation for 
attorneys practicing in immigration court, the concept has broader 
applicability. The principles developed in this Article can be 
applied beyond the markets for doctors, lawyers, and financial 
advisers to help mitigate information asymmetry problems in 
other markets. 
II. The Failed Markets for Professional Services 
Academics often contend that policymakers should hesitate to 
intervene in otherwise well-functioning markets.48 Market failures 
occur when something about the terms of the interaction prevents 
“market transactions from adequately serving the interests of all 
                                                                                                     
 44. Infra Part I. 
 45. Infra Part II. 
 46. Infra Part II. 
 47. Infra Part III. 
 48. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: 
The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 745 (1999) 
(describing the widely-accepted belief that among classical economists that 
“[p]olicymakers should not attempt to regulate or otherwise ‘interfere’ with 
markets absent some evidence of a market failure”); see also Thomas O. McGarity, 
The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1463, 1466 (1996) (“Although this ‘broken market’ paradigm may be useful 
analytically for studying some kinds of regulation, it rarely explains why 
Congress enacted protective statutes.”). 
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concerned.”49 Markets fail in different ways.50 In some instances, 
markets impose costs on others—giving rise to negative 
externalities.51 Negative externalities also arise when shoddy 
professional services generate costs for persons other than the 
client, such as a lawyer that files substandard briefs and drives 
judicial delays. 
Information asymmetries also drive market failures. Ordinary 
clients may struggle to adequately evaluate professional services52 
or to determine if they need professional assistance.53 Almost by 
definition, professional services markets have high degrees of 
information asymmetry. Professionals often specialize in solving 
information asymmetry problems because, in many instances, if a 
                                                                                                     
 49. See Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and 
Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and 
Uber?, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 293, 309 (2016) (discussing common market 
failures).  
 50. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 585 (2003) (“In particular, 
regulatory intervention may be appropriate where there is a market failure. 
Welfare economics classically recognizes four basic sources of market failures: 
(1) producer monopoly, (2) public goods, (3) information asymmetries, and 
(4) externalities.”). 
 51. For example, industrial polluters may not bear the costs created by their 
pollution. See Richard B. Stewart, Regulation in A Liberal State: The Role of 
Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1546 (1983) (“In the environmental 
area, pollution and toxic waste spillovers became conspicuous examples of market 
failures that led to calls for regulation.”). Their consumers may even prefer 
pollution because it leads to lower costs. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 
24, at 9 (“Pollution may be profit maximizing for firms in the absence of regulation 
because costs (such as damage to the air, vegetation, or water) are imposed on 
others.”). 
 52. See Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 
44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 551 (1994) (“The linchpin of the arguments 
supporting the exclusive professional license is the claim that the lawyer-client 
relationship is an asymmetric one: Clients cannot adequately evaluate the quality 
of the service, and consequently they must trust those they consult.”). One 
commentator defined the legal profession as “[a]n occupation whose members 
have special privileges, such as exclusive licensing,” justified by several 
assumptions, including that “clients cannot adequately evaluate the quality of 
service.” AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Report of the Commission on 
Professionalism to the Board of Governors and the House of Delegates of the 
American Bar Association, 112 F.R.D. 243, 261 (1986) (quoting Professor Eliot 
Freidson of New York University).  
 53. See Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 
73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2 (2012) (“[M]any do not even realize when a lawyer might be 
necessary or helpful.”). 
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client had the information necessary to evaluate a professional 
service, she would not need it. Consider financial advisers. If a 
potential client understood modern portfolio theory, she would not 
need a financial adviser’s assistance when allocating an 
investment portfolio. 
Information asymmetry concerns also justify professional 
self-regulation.54 If laypersons without professional expertise, 
background, and public service commitments do not understand 
the complexities of a professional practice, they cannot credibly 
regulate the delivery of professional services.55 This argument has 
supported claims that the public must trust professionals to 
regulate themselves.56 
Professionals differ from most other market participants 
because they often sell credence goods.57 Without the ability to 
evaluate a credence good’s quality, consumers must trust the 
professionals that provide it.58 Even after the service has been 
performed, a consumer may lack any real ability to evaluate the 
quality of the service provided.59 For example, a patient 
                                                                                                     
 54. See Gordon, supra note 25, at 1431 (describing the theory that “[o]nly 
professional peers have the necessary cognitive capacity and the appropriate 
ethical orientation to client and public service”). 
 55. But see Gerald C. Sternberg, Regulating the Legal Profession Board of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility Annual Report Fiscal Year July 1, 1995 to 
June 30, 1996, 69 WIS. LAW. 26 (1996) (“Public confidence in the attorney 
grievance program has been enhanced by including non-attorney members on 
these district panels and on the board.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 25, at 1431 (discussing self-regulation in the 
legal field). While the argument has a ring of truth to it, it only goes so far. Even 
if consumers cannot make fine-grain distinctions between professionals, that does 
not mean that they should be denied ready access to information with substantial 
predictive value. 
 57. See Nathaniel G. Hilger, Why Don’t People Trust Experts?, 59 J.L. & 
ECON. 293, 293 (2016) (“Doctors, lawyers, financial advisers, and auto mechanics 
all suffer from an apparent conflict of interest: these experts first diagnose the 
consumer’s condition, and then they treat the condition they have diagnosed. This 
is known as the credence-good problem.”). 
 58. See Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm 
Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1712–13 (1998) (“Clients cannot reduce agency 
costs by shopping for lawyers who will faithfully serve their interests because 
they cannot be sure that lawyers will keep their promise of loyalty. Legal services 
are a kind of ‘credence’ good whose qualities non-expert clients must take on 
trust.”). 
 59. See id. at 1713 (“Even discrete tasks such as drafting wills may be 
credence goods because the quality may not be evident until long after the job is 
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experiencing a post-surgical infection lacks any ability to 
determine whether the infection arose because of substandard 
medical care or because infections may follow even excellent 
surgeries. 
This dynamic also presents a classic agency cost problem 
where unaccountable agents should be expected to take advantage 
of their principals.60 Economic theory assumes that both the client 
and the professional seek to maximize their profits.61 Principals 
must incur costs to monitor agents to make sure the agent does not 
take advantage of the relationship. Similarly, agents incur 
bonding costs to assure their fidelity. Still, theory expects 
additional opportunism will occur simply because it may be too 
costly to prevent.62 With consumers unable to assess professional 
quality services before retaining a professional or to easily discover 
the quality of the services performed afterward, the market 
tolerates an astounding amount of this opportunism.63 
At present, today’s inefficient markets for professional 
services pose extraordinary threats to individuals and to society at 
large.64 For every degree of inefficiency in these markets, 
tremendous, widespread private and social costs accumulate. 
                                                                                                     
done.”). 
 60. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Disaggregated Classes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 
305, 319 (2015) (describing agency cost problems in the class action context). 
 61. See Robert Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, 32 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 400–01 (2007) (“For economists, the issue is how to motivate 
self-interested agents where information is asymmetric, behavioral and cognitive 
limitations exist, and monitoring is not feasible. Economists concern themselves 
with opportunism in all of its manifestations.”). 
 62. See Pearce, supra note 12, at 1232–33 (arguing that the taboo on 
profit-seeking behavior by lawyers should be discarded in favor of seeking 
business arrangements that promote the delivery of legal services and justice). 
 63. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the special 
obligations of the legal profession). 
 64. See Ben Barton, A Comparison Between the American Markets for 
Medical and Legal Services, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1331, 1333–34 (2016) (explaining 
that American markets for legal and medical services often fail to serve large 
swaths of the public—particularly the working poor). 
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A. Private and Public Concerns 
1. Private Concerns 
On the private cost side, individuals face a range of dangers 
from substandard to exploitative professional services. While some 
of the costs driven by substandard professional advice may also be 
thought of as public concerns, the direct client often bears most of 
the cost in these instances. 
a. Mortality Risk 
Trusting a substandard professional may cost individuals 
their lives. In the medical context, the risks may be particularly 
acute and may be increasing. A recent study found that medical 
error ranks as the third leading cause of death in the United States 
with approximately 251,000 deaths attributable to medical error 
annually.65 This study reports a higher number than prior studies 
which had found somewhat lower figures. One 2004 study found 
that 263,864 persons a year died because of medical error between 
2000 and 2002.66 In 1999, an Institute of Medicine study reported 
the lowest rate, finding that medical error caused between 44,000 
and 98,000 U.S. deaths annually.67  
Medical professionals do not internalize most of the costs 
generated by medical errors.68 For every six instances of medical 
                                                                                                     
 65. See Medical error—the third leading cause of death in the US, BMJ (May 
3, 2016), http://www.bmj.com/content/353/bmj.i2139 (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) 
(discussing the study) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also 
Arriana Eunjung Cha, Researchers: Medical Errors Now Third Leading Cause of 
Death in United States, WASH. POST, May 3, 2016 (same). 
 66. HEALTH GRADES QUALITY STUDY: PATIENT SAFETY IN AMERICAN HOSPITALS 
3 (2004), http://www.providersedge.com/ehdocs/ehr_articles/ 
Patient_Safety_in_American_Hospitals-2004.pdf. 
 67. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH 
SYSTEM 1 (1999), http://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/~/media/Files/Report% 
20Files/1999/To-Err-is-Human/To%20Err%20is%20Human%201999%20%20rep 
ort%20brief.pdf [hereinafter IOM, TO ERR IS HUMAN]. But see Rodney A. Hayward 
& Timothy P. Hofer, Estimating Hospital Deaths Due to Medical Errors: 
Preventability is in the Eye of the Reviewer, 286 JAMA 415, 419 n.10 (2001) 
(arguing that the IOM figures are exaggerated). 
 68. See Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, 
Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1270 (2004) (“The rate of 
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error, patients only file one malpractice claim against a medical 
professional.69 Even when a patient suffers significant damage, 
“tort reform” statutes often limit the amount of recoverable 
damages.70 The Institute of Medicine’s study found that medical 
errors cost society between $17–29 billion annually.71 At around 
the same time, medical professionals only paid approximately $6.4 
billion in medical malpractice insurance costs.72 
b. Diminished Health 
Substandard medical care does not always lead to death.73 In 
many instances, it may simply mean that a patient takes longer to 
recover than she would have had she received a more appropriate 
treatment or no treatment at all.74 In others, a patient may live on 
with a permanent condition or disability. One study found a 
“fourfold difference” in complication rates between hospitals that 
perform common hip and knee surgeries.75 Given how many hip 
                                                                                                     
preventable medical error far exceeds the number of malpractice claims.”). 
 69. See id. (collecting research finding that “[s]everal research studies have 
estimated that for every six incidents of medical error, only one becomes a 
malpractice claim”). 
 70. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West 2016) (“In no action shall the 
amount of damages for noneconomic losses exceed two hundred fifty thousand 
dollars ($250,000).”). 
 71. See IOM, TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 67, at 1 (reporting the estimated 
societal impact of medical errors). 
 72. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, MEDICAL MISDIAGNOSIS: CHALLENGING THE 
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS OF THE DOCTOR’S LOBBY 9 (2003) [hereinafter PUBLIC 
CITIZEN, MEDICAL MISDIAGNOSIS] (comparing the amount spent on medical 
malpractice insurance to the societal impact of medical errors). 
 73. See What Patients Need to Know About Medical Malpractice, MED. 
MALPRACTICE CTR. (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.malpracticecenter.com/ 
news/10/15/15/what-patients-need-to-know-about-medical-malpractice (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2017) (“[N]on-fatal claims cases filed annually in the US amount 
to billions of dollars in claims settlements or trial verdicts each year . . . .”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 74.  See, e.g., D’Abbraccio v. New Rochelle Hosp. Med. Ctr., 654 N.Y.S.2d 383, 
384 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“The plaintiff presented expert medical opinion 
evidence that the initial failure to diagnose her injury and properly treat it led to 
an exacerbation of her injuries and a prolonged hospital stay.”). 
 75. Kevin J. Bozic et al., Variation in Hospital-Level Risk-Standardized 
Complication Rates Following Elective Primary Total Hip and Knee Arthroplasty, 
96 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 640, 646 (2014). 
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and knee replacements occur each year,76 the different 
complication rates reveal real risks that consumers might seek to 
avoid. Even if the relatively higher rates may not be due to “error” 
so much as the superior skill at other institutions, patients and 
high-quality doctors would benefit from better dissemination of 
this information. 
Substandard professional services may also create ongoing, 
significant stress that leads to other health consequences.77 Even 
non-medical professionals may impact their clients’ health in 
significant ways. Losing a significant amount of money because of 
a financial adviser’s fraud can drive a range of health problems.78 
One study found that more than a third of fraud victims became 
depressed afterward and an even higher percentage reported 
difficulty sleeping afterward.79 A significant body of research has 
found that ongoing stress may drive negative health 
consequences.80 
                                                                                                     
 76. See generally Hilal Maradit Kremers et al., Prevalence of Total Hip and 
Knee Replacement in the United States, 97 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 1386 (2015) 
(counting the number of hip and knee replacements in the United States). 
 77. Cf. Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral 
Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 449 (2005) (“Ongoing stress imposed by lengthy 
divorce and child-custody proceedings, hostile corporate takeovers, or fear about 
meeting year-end production quotas, for example, can contribute to serious, 
life-threatening medical conditions.”); see also Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted 
Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets 
Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1141, 1173 (2001) (arguing that humans 
evolved in an environment where “most severe but survivable stresses passed 
more quickly than multi-district litigations, lengthy divorce proceedings, or 
corporate takeovers”). 
 78. See Susan Antilla, How Bad Financial Advice Can Literally Make You 
Sick, STREET (June 19, 2016, 2:20 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/ 
13607594/1/how-bad-financial-advice-can-literally-make-you-sick.html (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2017) (“[T]he stress of a serious financial loss can trigger a whole new 
wave of costs for clients.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 79. See APPLIED RESEARCH & CONSULTING LLC, NON-TRADITIONAL COSTS OF 
FINANCIAL FRAUD 5 (2015) (reporting survey results). 
 80. See Elizabeth Agnvall, Stress! Don’t Let it Make You Sick: New research 
reveals the links between stress and disease, AARP (Nov. 2014), 
http://www.aarp.org/health/healthy-living/info-2014/stress-and-disease.html 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (collecting research on the negative health effects 
caused by stress) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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c. Lost Profits & Increased Expenses 
Even if professional services do not result in death or 
diminished health, they often impose significant costs. Consider 
the healthcare costs in McAllen, Texas—which recently ranked as 
one of the “most expensive health-care markets in the country.”81 
One surgeon explained the problem as “‘overutilization . . . pure 
and simple’” and that for doctors the practice had become about 
“[h]ow much will you benefit?”82 Doctors in McAllen gave patients 
“two to three times as many pacemakers, implantable 
defibrillators, cardiac-bypass operations, carotid 
endarterectomies, and coronary-artery stents” as in other 
jurisdictions.83 Although patients received invasive and high cost 
procedures, they were “less likely to receive low-cost preventive 
services, such as flu and pneumonia vaccines.”84 
Patients often have no reasonable means of assessing the 
quality of medical advice or of an advice-giver. If a doctor tells a 
patient that a heart surgery will significantly reduce the risks she 
faces in the future, she may have no ready means of determining 
whether the medical advice provided is good. On the other hand, if 
she had ready access to information indicating that a doctor 
recommends heart surgeries at triple the national rate, she might 
pause. This information could make the investment in obtaining 
additional opinions seem more reasonable. 
But doctors are not the only professionals needlessly 
generating expenses for patients. Low-quality, conflict-ridden 
financial advice now causes many persons to pay excessive fees and 
experience suboptimal retirements. In February of 2015, the White 
House Council of Economic Advisers released a report on conflicted 
investment advice, conservatively estimating that “the aggregate 
annual cost of conflicted advice is about $17 billion each year” for 
                                                                                                     
 81. Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum: What a Texas Town Can Teach Us 
About Health Care, NEW YORKER (June 1, 2009), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/01/the-cost-conundrum (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Gawande, Cost Conundrum] (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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retirement savers.85 For the average retiree, low-quality advice 
will result in running out of money five years sooner than if the 
advice had been unbiased and in the client’s interest.86 
2. Public Concerns 
In addition to significant individual harms, poor professional 
advice also generates negative externalities and drives significant 
social harms that affect more than the parties to the relationship.87 
Put differently, engaging a substandard professional may harm 
more than the client—it may drive harms to society as well. 
Improving professional services markets would reduce public 
costs. 
a. Substandard Professionals Generate Negative Externalities 
Markets that sustain substandard professionals may drive 
public costs.88 Consider the social costs created by incompetent 
attorneys. Judges and attorneys may spend excessive amounts of 
time addressing frivolous or plainly meritless arguments, 
generating crowded dockets, and slowing the delivery of justice 
generally.89 
                                                                                                     
 85. Jason Furman & Betsey Stevenson, The Effects of Conflicted Investment 
Advice on Retirement Savings, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 23, 2015, 9:45 AM), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/02/23/effects-conflicted-investme 
nt-advice-retirement-savings (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) [hereinafter CEA, 
CONFLICTED ADVICE] (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 86. See id. (noting the effects of conflicts of interest on advice). 
 87. See Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional 
Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 705 (1977) (“[T]he costs of dispute resolution 
and the impact of delay are rarely limited to the particular parties—the social 
costs involved are borne by society as a whole.”). 
 88. See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on the Professionalism 
Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 273 (1995) (“[S]ome of the costs of relative 
incompetence are borne, not by the consumer, but by the rest of us, in the form of 
delays, docket crowding, or additional judges.”). 
 89. See Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological 
Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 163–64 (2000) (“[I]t is clear that many of the civil 
justice system’s primary players and spectators are deeply concerned about the 
persistence of frivolous suits, both because frivolous suits are ‘bad’ and because 
the courts cannot adequately process nonfrivolous suits as long as frivolous suits 
clog the system.”). 
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Frivolous litigation launched by low-quality lawyers may 
impose costs outside the legal system as well.90 Consider the 
choices faced by multinational business entities. When deciding 
whether to build production facilities in a particular jurisdiction, 
the business will consider additional uncertainty, cost, and risk 
posed by the litigation environment.91 If the jurisdiction carries an 
excessive amount of litigation risk or inflated legal costs from 
frivolous suits, the business will likely allocate its investment 
elsewhere. 
Still, quantifying the size of the purported frivolous litigation 
problem may be difficult. Some evidence indicates that extended 
medical malpractice litigation, at the least, rarely involves the 
assertion of truly frivolous claims.92 Plaintiffs may file some 
actions simply to get access to the information needed to evaluate 
the claim—in many instances plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss their 
cases after reviewing information.93 
b. Suppressed Demand for Professional Services 
Integrity plays a vital economic role in facilitating 
transactions.94 It allows transaction partners to rely on each other 
and complete value-increasing projects. Without integrity, many 
otherwise socially useful transactions will not occur.95 
                                                                                                     
 90. Cf. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation 
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court 
and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 984 (2003) (“Critics 
maintain that excessive and frivolous litigation . . . hinders America’s competitive 
position in the global economy.”). 
 91. See John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective 
Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 595 (2010) (“The uncertainty and cost 
associated with frivolous lawsuits dissuade foreign companies from doing 
business in America, depriving the U.S. economy of a much-needed source of jobs 
and investment.”). 
 92. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, MEDICAL MISDIAGNOSIS, supra note 72, at 3 
(reporting that plaintiffs only pursue one out of ten claims filed). 
 93. See id. (hypothesizing about why plaintiffs pursue a low rate of filed 
claims). 
 94. See ANNA BERNASEK, THE ECONOMICS OF INTEGRITY 11 (2010) (describing 
integrity as “the underpinning for all our commercial relationships”). 
 95. See id. at 11–12 (“For without integrity, the economy would not function. 
There would be no trading, no credit, no buying or selling.”). 
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A poorly functioning market for professional services may lead 
to underproduction and underemployment of professionals.96 
Consider how a similar dynamic occurs in financial markets—if 
investors distrust an issuer, they will discount the amount they 
are willing to invest in a promising project to offset the risk that 
they are being scammed.97 In a low-trust environment, investors 
should be expected to invest less than they would in a higher-trust 
environment.98  
The same dynamics affect other markets. A person will behave 
differently when she suspects a professional may assert the need 
for useless services.99 Medical patients rationally fear that doctors 
will prescribe unnecessary treatments. If a patient has a potential 
medical issue, she might wait until she can be certain she needs 
medical assistance before consulting with a doctor.  
Public distrust of legal professionals may drive significant 
underutilization of legal services. Many surveys and anecdotal 
reports indicate that the public generally distrusts lawyers.100 
Recent studies have found that while 18% of respondents thought 
lawyers had “high” or “very high” honesty or ethical standards, 
37% believed that lawyers had “low” or “very low” honesty or 
                                                                                                     
 96. See Ribstein, supra note 58, at 1713 (“Clients’ difficulty in evaluating the 
potential agency costs inherent in legal representation may reduce their 
willingness to entrust work to lawyers and therefore lessen both lawyers’ 
revenues and clients’ potential gains from hiring lawyers.”). 
 97. See Ziven Scott Birdwell, The Key Elements for Developing a Securities 
Market to Drive Economic Growth: A Roadmap for Emerging Markets, 39 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 535, 545 (2011) (arguing that abuses “eat away at capital 
markets, destroy investor confidence, and increase the cost of capital”). 
 98. Cf. Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. 
REV. 928, 967 (2014) (“If investors come to see the securities markets as a rigged 
game—one that seems by design to systematically disadvantage ordinary 
investors—they could respond by discounting the amount that they are willing to 
pay for all securities, thereby raising the cost of capital.”); see also Richard A. 
Booth, Index Funds and Securities Fraud Litigation, 64 S.C. L. REV. 265, 272 
(2012) (“[A]n increase in cost of capital may come from two sources: a market 
perception of more risk inherent in the business of the subject company or harm 
to the reputation of the subject company—a loss of trust.”). 
 99. See Gawande, Cost Conundrum, supra note 81 (describing how “heart 
operations and catheter procedures and pacemakers were being performed in 
McAllen at double the usual rate”). 
 100. See Andrew M. Perlman, Toward a Unified Theory of Professional 
Regulation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 977, 1010–11 nn.206–07 (2003) (explaining that “the 
public holds lawyers in particularly low esteem”). 
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ethical standards.101 In contrast, medical doctors received 
substantially higher ratings, with 65% responding that medical 
doctors were highly or very highly ethical.102 
Despite the widespread distrust, the public strongly values 
lawyer integrity. One study found that when consumers were 
asked to rank eighteen different factors relevant to selecting a 
lawyer, integrity rose to the top of the list—outranking experience 
and cost.103 Consumers may value integrity because it allows them 
to trust their service provider to act in their interest in areas where 
they cannot effectively monitor the attorney’s performance. 
Concern with lawyer integrity likely impedes the engagement 
of legal services. To be sure, substantial evidence indicates that the 
current market frequently fails to match attorneys with unmet 
service needs.104 Economist and law professor Gillian Hadfield 
calculated the unmet need for professional legal services as 
“roughly $20 billion to ‘tens if not hundreds of billions of 
dollars.’”105  
Improved tools allowing the public to better assess 
professional service providers might also mitigate the lawyer 
underemployment problem by making it easier for the public to 
identify higher quality lawyers. As confidence increases that 
attorneys will deliver valuable services, public demand for legal 
services should also rise.  
An expansion of legal services markets would benefit lawyers. 
In 2011, only a little more than half of freshly-minted lawyers 
found employment within nine months.106 While law schools have 
                                                                                                     
 101. See Honesty/Ethics in Professions, GALLUP (Dec. 11, 2016), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1654/honesty-ethics-professions.aspx (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2017) (publishing survey results) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 102. See id. (same). Doctors may enjoy their higher ratings because they do 
not work within an adversarial system. 
 103. See Robert E. Smith & Tiffany S. Meyer, Attorney Advertising: A 
Consumer Perspective, 44 J. MARKETING 56, 60 (1980) (relating consumers’ top 
considerations when selecting an attorney). 
 104. See Knake, supra note 30, at 1283–84 (discussing demand for legal 
services compared with attorney employment).  
 105. Id. at 1287 (quoting Gillian Hadfield, Lawyers, Make Room for 
Nonlawyers, CNN (Nov. 25, 2012, 12:25 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/23/opinion/hadfield-legal-profession/index.html 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)). 
 106. See Joe Palazzolo, Law Grads Face Brutal Job Market, WALL ST. J., June 
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contracted and reduced production of new lawyers, many lawyers 
remain underemployed.107  
c. Overspending on Other Categories of Professional Services 
Interestingly, an inefficient market for professional services 
may also drive overproduction. If consumers cannot identify 
professionals that cause them to expend excessive sums on 
professional services, the inefficient market structure may 
sometimes also drive overutilization of professional services.  
(1) Healthcare 
Overproduction and cost problems appear particularly 
pronounced in the health care context.108 In 2012, the United 
States spent approximately $2.6 trillion on health care.109 By 2015, 
the annual expenditure had grown to $3.1 trillion.110 In a report 
released in 2012, the Institute of Medicine found that about 
one-third of overall spending may be unnecessary.111 Worse, 
                                                                                                     
25, 2012, at A1 (reporting on job prospects for law school graduates). 
 107. See Andrew Soergel, Hiring Outlook Bleak for New Law Grads, U.S. 
NEWS AND WORLD REP. (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/ 
2016-08-18/hiring-outlook-bleak-for-new-law-grads (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) 
(reporting on more recent employment data for recent law school graduates) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 108. Cf. Jessica L. Roberts & Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, What is (and isn’t) 
Healthism?, 50 GA. L. REV. 833, 897 (2016) (“Health care is very expensive in the 
United States . . . .”); see also David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do 
Less: Financial Incentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155, 155 (1996) 
(“With health care costs continuing to rise, it has become increasingly clear that 
we cannot afford all medically beneficial care.”). 
 109. See Sarah Kliff, We Spend $750 Billion on Unnecessary Health Care. Two 
Charts Explain Why, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2012), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2012/09/07/we-spend-750-billion-on-unneces 
sary-health-care-two-charts-explain-why/?utm_term=.882e2e882940 (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2017) (reporting on unnecessary healthcare spending) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 110. See Tami Luhby, Health Care Spending Expected to Grow Faster, CNN 
MONEY (July 28, 2015, 7:36 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/28/news/ 
economy/health-care-spending/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (reporting on 
healthcare spending levels) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 111. See Kliff, supra note 109 (reporting on unnecessary healthcare 
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despite the high cost, the actual quality of health care in the 
United States appears middling, at best.112 
The compensation structure for many physicians may drive 
some overutilization of health care services.113 At present, many 
medical professionals receive compensation tied to how many 
procedures they perform.114 When certain procedures pay more 
than others, those procedures may become even more likely to be 
performed. Combined, these incentives may drive significant 
overutilization of health services.  
Adding to the difficulty, the market for health services 
generally fails to provide consumers with information before they 
commit to purchasing decisions.115 Consumers generally lack 
                                                                                                     
spending). 
 112. See Isaac D. Buck, Caring Too Much: Misapplying the False Claims Act 
to Target Overtreatment, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 463, 470 (2013) (“Nevertheless, not only 
are the federal health-care programs speeding toward bankruptcy, but the quality 
of U.S. health care is mediocre, the headlines say.”); see also John B. Kirkwood, 
Buyer Power and Healthcare Prices, 91 WASH. L. REV. 253, 254 (2016) (“Many 
studies have found that the United States spends nearly twice as much per capita 
on healthcare as other developed countries, while achieving inferior results on 
such important public health measures as life expectancy and infant mortality.”); 
Sarah Kliff, Sebelius: Repeal a Bad Deal for U.S., POLITICO (Mar. 31, 2011, 4:47 
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/52339.html (last visited Sept. 21, 
2017) (“We pay 2 1/2 times what anybody else pays in the world, and our care 
outcomes look like we’re in a developing country.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 113. See Barbara A. Noah & Neal R. Feigenson, Avoiding Overtreatment at 
the End of Life: Physician-Patient Communication and Truly Informed Consent, 
36 PACE L. REV. 736, 751 (2016)  
All of these problems are made worse by the fact that the system of 
reimbursement for health care in the United States often deforms the 
goals of care by paying physicians who provide more treatments and 
tests while failing to reimburse physicians for the more 
time-consuming and emotionally onerous task of discussing with 
patients the option of doing less. 
Alan M. Garber & Jonathan Skinner, Is American Health Care Uniquely 
Inefficient?, 22 J. ECON. PERSPS. 27, 28 (2008) (“The fundamental cause is a 
combination of high prices for inputs, poorly restrained incentives for 
overutilization, and a tendency to adopt expensive medical innovations rapidly, 
even when evidence of effectiveness is weak or absent.”). 
 114. See Jennifer Brougham, Physician-Owned Distributorships, 30 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 369, 370 (2016) (“For decades, the U.S. health care 
system predominantly used a fee-for-service model, in which physicians and 
hospitals were compensated for each service performed and had full discretion 
over treatment decisions, incentivizing overutilization and increased costs.”). 
 115. See William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws 
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information about both cost and quality—forcing them to commit 
to services with little information about a professional’s actual 
skill.116 This may mean that lower-quality medical professions and 
institutions may drive high costs while delivering subpar results 
for their patients without any significant market force pushing for 
higher quality. 
(2) Financial Intermediation 
Overproduction problems also plague the market for financial 
services—overall costs have remained puzzlingly high. One study 
found that “the unit cost of intermediation is about as high today 
as it was at the turn of the 20th century.”117 Bafflingly high costs 
persist even though improvements in information technology 
“should lower the physical transaction costs of buying, pooling and 
holding financial assets.”118 
The high overall costs may be explained by examining the 
incentives for financial professionals. Financial advisers, often 
commission-compensated salespeople, face significant incentives 
to steer customers toward higher priced and less useful 
products.119 Often, financial advisers steer clients toward investing 
in higher-fee funds simply because those funds pay a portion of 
                                                                                                     
and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1716 (1999) (“Moreover, 
purchasers’ lack of information stands out as the biggest obstacle to competitive 
care management.”). 
 116. See id. (“Information deficits in health care relate to each of the three 
dimensions along which American health care is typically measured: cost, access 
to services, and quality of care.”). 
 117. Thomas Philippon, Has the U.S. Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? 
On the Theory and Measurement of Financial Intermediation 5 (NBER, Working 
Paper No. 18077, 2014) [hereinafter Philippon, Less Efficient]. 
 118. See id. at 25–26 (“A potential explanation is oligopolistic competition but 
the link between market power and the unit cost of intermediation is not easy to 
establish.”). 
 119. See Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers As Fiduciaries, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 
439, 449 (2010) (discussing the compensation incentives for stockbrokers to steer 
clients toward higher-priced products); see also Benjamin P. Edwards, Fiduciary 
Duty and Investment Advice: Will a Uniform Fiduciary Duty Make A Material 
Difference?, 14 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 105, 121 (2014) (“Broker commissions vary by 
financial product sold and not simply by the amount of the transaction. These 
distorting incentives have long been recognized as creating material conflicts 
between the Broker’s interests and the client’s interests.”). 
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their fees to the financial adviser—not because they will generate 
the best returns for the investor.120 In many instances, this means 
that financial advisers steer clients toward purchasing 
actively-managed funds even though low-cost, passively-managed 
funds significantly outperform actively-managed funds.121 
Financial advisers even steer clients toward higher-cost 
passively-managed funds—causing their clients to buy guaranteed 
underperformance.122 An index fund with fees of 1.25% will always 
lose to an index fund tracking the same index with fees of 0.09%. 
For asset management services, higher cost does not translate 
into higher returns. It has been well-established for decades that 
lower fees offer the best prediction of superior performance.123 The 
same notion has been encapsulated in “Brown’s Law of Brokerage 
Product Compensation,” instructing that “[t]he higher the 
commission or selling concession a broker is paid to sell a product, 
the worse that product will be for his or her clients.”124 Despite 
this, about two-thirds of mutual fund assets now reside with 
actively-managed funds.125  
Investors continue to work with financial advisers after 
receiving bad advice—such as the advice to buy a high-fee 
actively-managed mutual fund—for a variety of reasons. Many 
                                                                                                     
 120. See SECS. AND EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
COMPENSATION PRACTICES 7–8 (1995) (questioning whether a Broker rendered 
“objective advice or simply maximiz[ed] commission income”). 
 121. See Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelligence and Control: 
Retirement Savings and the Limits of Soft Paternalism, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. 
REV. 35, 59 n.102 (2015) (likening the debate over active versus passive investing 
to the debate over climate change because the debate persists even though the 
relative underperformance of active management has been conclusively 
established for decades). 
 122. See Edwards, Dark Side, supra note 25, at 29 (describing high-fee index 
funds). 
 123. See John C. Bogle, A New Order of Things: Bringing Mutuality to the 
“Mutual” Fund, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1089, 1110 (2008) (collecting research). 
 124.  JOSHUA M. BROWN, BACKSTAGE WALL STREET: AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO 
KNOWING WHO TO TRUST, WHO TO RUN FROM, AND HOW TO MAXIMIZE YOUR 
INVESTMENTS 217–18 (2012). 
 125. Anne Tergesen & Jason Zweig, The Dying Business of Picking Stocks, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2016, 12:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-dying-
business-of-picking-stocks-1476714749 (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (explaining 
that although investors now move significantly toward passive strategies, “66% 
of mutual-fund and exchange-traded-fund assets are still actively invested”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Americans lack even rudimentary financial literacy.126 This means 
that they often never realize that they received bad advice. Adding 
to the difficulty, many persons use financial advisers for assistance 
during periods of their lives where they suffer significant cognitive 
declines—further inhibiting their ability to effectively monitor a 
financial adviser’s exploitative advice.127 
Much like how frivolous litigation increases costs within the 
judicial system, overproduction of financial intermediation may 
drive significant harm to the economy by creating a bloated 
financial intermediation sector.128 Research indicates that the size 
of a nation’s financial intermediation sector roughly correlates 
with its growth rates—a nation with too little financial 
intermediation struggles to pair investor resources with business 
opportunities, while an overly large financial sector also slows 
growth by causing assets to recirculate within the financial 
system.129 
                                                                                                     
 126. See OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUC. & ADVOCACY, SECS. AND EXCH. COMM’N, 
STAFF STUDY REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG INVESTORS viii (2012) 
(explaining that “many investors do not understand other key financial concepts, 
such as diversification or the differences between stocks and bonds”). 
 127. See ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, 2012 ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE FACTS AND FIGURES, 
REPORT, at 14 (2012) (explaining that 13% of persons over sixty-five, and 45% of 
persons over eighty-five, suffer from dementia). 
 128. Cf. Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 575 
(2015) (“[R]ecent studies suggest that the relationship between the size of a 
country’s financial sector and the rate of its development is an inverted ‘U’—
having a robust financial system is critical for economic growth, but too much 
finance impedes development.”); see, e.g., Siong Hook Law & Nirvikar Singh, Does 
Too Much Finance Harm Economic Growth?, 41 J. BANKING & FIN. 36 (2014) 
(noting that in the relationship between finance and economic growth, more 
finance is only beneficial to a certain point); see also Jean-Louis Arcand, Enrico 
Berkes & Ugo Panizza, Too Much Finance?, at 3 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper No. 12/161, 2012) (observing “the standard result that, at intermediate 
levels of financial depth, there is a positive relationship between the size of the 
financial system and economic growth, but it also shows that, at high levels of 
financial depth, more finance is associated with less growth”); Stephen G. 
Cecchetti & Enisse Kharroubi, Reassessing the Impact of Finance on Growth 1 
(Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Papers No. 381, 2012) (“[A]s is the case with 
many things in life, with finance you can have too much of a good thing.”). 
 129. See RANA FOROOHAR, MAKERS AND TAKERS: THE RISE OF FINANCE AND THE 
FALL OF AMERICAN BUSINESS 13 (2016) (“[S]tudies show that countries with large 
and quickly growing financial systems tend to exhibit weaker productivity 
growth.”). 
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An overly large financial sector may also create drag on 
economic growth through inefficient capital allocation.130 This 
happens because commission-compensated financial advisers now 
steer capital with a preference for issuers offering larger 
commissions to financial advisers. When issuers compete not only 
based on the merits and the risks of their offerings, but also on how 
effectively they bias capital-steering intermediaries, the likelihood 
that the best opportunities secure funding diminishes.131 
Inefficient financial services may drive other, less obvious 
costs. For example, conflicts of interest drive approximately $17 
billion in annual fees from consumers.132 This means that 
retirement savers receiving conflicted advice may ultimately 
receive 12% less in retirement and run out of retirement savings 
years before they would have if they had received non-conflicted 
advice.133 This also imposes significant costs on an investor’s 
extended family—meaning that subsequent generations may not 
be able to take risks and found businesses if they need to hold on 
to employment to fund medical expenses for aging parents. Social 
support systems—such as Medicare—may even experience 
increased utilization because of the drain on resources created by 
conflicted financial advice. An overlarge financial sector may even 
distort human capital flows—causing the most talented to go into 
finance instead of pursuing careers in business. 
B. Current Tools Function Poorly 
It has been apparent for some time that the market failures in 
professional services markets impose tremendous costs on 
individuals and the public. Much of our current regulatory 
infrastructure exists to improve these markets and to protect the 
public from the worst possible abuses. This subpart considers why 
current markets and the occupational-licensing model often fail to 
protect the public. 
                                                                                                     
 130. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L. 
J. 181, 184 (2017) (examining the economic effects of financial regulations). 
 131. See id. (same). 
 132. See CEA, CONFLICTED ADVICE, supra note 85 (examining the effects of 
conflicting advice). 
 133. See id. (same). 
1484 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1457 (2017) 
1. Reputation’s Current Limited Force 
Reputation only plays a limited role in the current markets for 
professional services. To be sure, reputational pressures may 
increase when professionals practice together in significant 
groups. If professionals operate under the same brand, bad acts 
from one member of the group may create a stigma attributable to 
all group members. This shared reputation may create an 
incentive to self-police and to protect the brand because a 
reputation for quality allows members of a professional firm to 
charge higher prices.134 
Judging a professional by her associations may be a 
reasonable strategy. In the financial context, researchers found 
that when troubled financial advisers cluster in a firm, their 
colleagues tend to absorb the cultural norms.135 One study found 
that financial advisers with unblemished records were more likely 
to have misconduct in the future if they associated with financial 
advisers that had misconduct markers on their records.136 
Remarking on similar findings, two economists recently theorized 
that a heightened concentration of brokers with misconduct 
disclosures might provide information about “compliance culture” 
at a particular firm.137  
The limited incentive for professional firms to police their own 
ranks will not protect most consumers because many professionals 
                                                                                                     
 134. See Ribstein, supra note 7, at 754 (“Clients are willing to pay extra to 
buy legal services from a big firm because they know that a cheating firm incurs 
a penalty in the form of a diminished reputation and a lower price for its 
services.”). 
 135. See Stephen G. Dimmock, William C. Gerken & Nathaniel P. Graham, Is 
Fraud Contagious? Co-Worker Influence on Misconduct by Financial Advisors 4 
(Apr. 7, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (“Controlling for merger-firm fixed 
effects, and using changes to a financial advisor’s peers due to a merger, we show 
that an advisor is 37% more likely to commit misconduct if his [new] co-workers 
have a history of misconduct.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 136. See id. (noting also an asymmetry in this effect, such that while learning 
bad behavior from peers is easy, unlearning it from peers is not). 
 137. See Hammad Qureshi & Jonathan S. Sokobin, Do Investors Have 
Valuable Information About Brokers? 19  (FINRA, Working Paper Aug. 20, 2015) 
(“[Harm Associated with Colleagues] has a statistically significant positive 
coefficient . . . . Overall, these results show that including information about 
[Harm Associated with Colleagues] on BrokerCheck would increase the 
predictability of investor harm.”). 
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do not practice within large firms. In the legal services market, 
most attorneys practice either alone or in relatively small firms.138 
Medium to large law firms with more than fifty lawyers account 
for only twenty percent of the legal services market.139 Given the 
market’s general fragmentation, firm reputation may only rarely 
play a role. 
For market forces to function effectively, reputation must play 
a significant role. Yet reputation only plays a weak role in the 
current markets for professional services because public 
consumers both struggle to recognize and broadcast information 
about low quality professionals. Two things must happen for 
reputation to function effectively: (i) a consumer must recognize 
that they received substandard services; and (ii) the consumer 
must somehow broadcast that discovery to other consumers.140  
a. Discovery Problems 
Consumers often struggle to recognize low-quality 
professional services because professionals sell credence goods.141 
The surgical context provides a vivid illustration. The consumer 
may not even be conscious while the professional performs the 
service—effectively removing the consumer’s ability to monitor 
performance directly.  
Still, some interventions might increase the likelihood of 
discovery. For example, information about average fees and 
outcomes might put consumers on alert. Even though three 
percent might seem a small percentage, most mutual funds charge 
significantly lower ongoing fees. Simply giving consumers this 
                                                                                                     
 138. See LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 1 (2016), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/l
awyer-demographics-tables-2016.authcheckdam.pdf (noting that 49% of 
attorneys practiced on their own and another 14% practiced in firms with between 
two and five attorneys). 
 139. See id. (same). 
 140. See Kathryn Judge, Fee Effects, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1517, 1550 (2013) 
(describing the two reputation feedback channels in general terms). 
 141. See Ribstein, supra note 58, at 1712–13 (“Even discrete tasks such as 
drafting wills may be credence goods because the quality may not be evident until 
long after the job is done.”).  
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information may cause them to more critically consider services 
falling outside the norm. 
b. Broadcast Problems 
Because professional misconduct may only be discovered in 
rare instances, the broadcast channel remains the critical avenue 
for reputational pressure. Despite this, our current systems fail to 
broadcast information about professionals effectively. Even when 
reliable data identifies higher quality professionals, the public fails 
to receive the information.142 For example, Pennsylvania collected 
and analyzed information on heart surgeries and other 
treatments.143 Despite public availability, few patients knew about 
the information or took it into account when making decisions.144 
Without ready access to more useful information, most persons 
simply rely on the recommendations of their friends and 
relatives.145 
Simply getting the information out may be a challenge. 
Ordinary consumers now face a significant incentive problem. If a 
consumer discovers substandard professional services, she will 
likely gain little by broadcasting that information publicly. In 
contrast, she may receive some compensation if she agrees to keep 
quiet about substandard service.  
Amplifying the broadcast problems, professional 
organizations now seemingly facilitate the suppression of useful 
                                                                                                     
 142. For example, the State of Pennsylvania has spent millions of dollars to 
gather relatively sophisticated evidence on outcomes from cardiac interventions, 
including cardiac surgery. See Eric C. Schneider & Arnold M. Epstein, Use of 
Public Performance Reports: A Survey of Patients Undergoing Cardiac Surgery, 
279 JAMA 1638, 1638 (1998) (explaining that a publicly available study was not 
frequently used by the public). 
 143. See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical 
Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1597 
(2002) (describing Pennsylvania program and explaining that patients “still seem 
to pick their hospitals and physicians as a matter of individual recommendation 
or convenience” and not based on data). 
 144. See id. (“[A] recent study found that very few cardiac surgery patients in 
Pennsylvania are aware of or use this information in any significant fashion.”). 
 145. See, e.g., Elise C. Becher & Mark R. Chassin, Improving the Quality of 
Health Care: Who Will Lead?, 20 HEALTH AFF. 164, 170 (2001) (stating that “the 
large majority [of patients] rely on [recommendations of] friends and family” when 
choosing doctors or hospitals). 
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information. For example, the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA) manages the Central Registration Depository 
(CRD), which centralizes information about stockbrokers.146 
FINRA and the North American Securities Administrators 
Association (NASAA) partnered to create the database because of 
their belief that it is “critical that information about these 
individuals and firms be readily accessible to the investing 
public.”147 To make the information accessible, FINRA provides a 
“BrokerCheck” website that allows the public to access information 
contained in the CRD database.148 
Unfortunately, the BrokerCheck website does not disclose 
information in a form that allows investors to assess risk 
effectively.149 One review of the BrokerCheck website found that 
“BrokerCheck data in its current form is virtually useless to 
investors trying to protect themselves from bad brokers.”150 
                                                                                                     
 146. Order Approving A Proposed Rule Change Amending the Codes of 
Arbitration Procedure to Establish Procedures for Arbitrators to Follow When 
Considering Requests for Expungement Relief, Exchange Act Release No. 34–
58886, 94 SEC Docket 1445, at 2 (Oct. 30, 2008) (“FINRA operates the Central 
Registration Depository (“CRD”) pursuant to policies developed jointly with the 
North American Securities Administrators Association.” (citation omitted)). 
 147. CRD & IARD, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, http://www.nasaa.org/industry-
resources/investment-advisers/crd-iard/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 148. BrokerCheck by FINRA, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., 
https://brokercheck.finra.org/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 149. See HUGH D. BERKSON & MARNIE C. LAMBERT, BROKERCHECK—THE 
INEQUALITY OF INVESTOR ACCESS TO INFORMATION REMAINS UNABATED—AN 
UPDATE TO PIABA’S MARCH 2014 REPORT 24 (Oct. 19, 2016), 
https://piaba.org/system/files/pdfs/Broker%20Check%20Update%20(October%20
20,%202016).pdf (“[I]t has become increasingly apparent that the data contained 
in the national CRD system, and thus BrokerCheck reports, is incomplete, 
unreliable or even false.”); see also Mark Schoeff, FINRA Targets Firms Hiring 
Brokers With Checkered Pasts, INVESTMENTNEWS (Jan. 6, 2017, 1:05 PM), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20170106/FREE/170109956/finra-targets-
firms-hiring-brokers-with-checkered-pasts (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (“Finra has 
recognized that these brokers pose a risk, but its BrokerCheck disclosures and 
data do not adequately warn the public about the actual risk created by brokers 
with regulatory disclosures . . . .” (quoting Ben Edwards)) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 150. CRAIG MCCANN, CHUAN QIN & MIKE YAN, HOW WIDESPREAD AND 
PREDICTABLE IS STOCK BROKER MISCONDUCT? 3 (2016), 
http://www.slcg.com/pdf/workingpapers/McCann%20Qin%20and%20Yan%20on
%20BrokerCheck.pdf. 
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FINRA’s website only allows the public to access tiny slivers of 
information at a time and makes it available without useful 
context.151  
Making diligence less effective, FINRA’s BrokerCheck website 
only presents a limited subset of the information available within 
the CRD database.152 A Wall Street Journal investigation found 
that “38,400 brokers have regulatory or financial red flags that 
appear only on state records” that do not appear on 
BrokerCheck.153 The investigation found that 19,000 brokers with 
complaints on their regulatory records appeared as though they 
had clean records on BrokerCheck.154 
The information suppression extends beyond BrokerCheck 
and to the CRD database itself. FINRA oversees a process through 
which brokers frequently expunge information from the CRD 
database.155 Although FINRA characterizes expungement as an 
“extraordinary” remedy,156 one study found that in 2013, 
arbitrators granted motions to expunge complaints 93.66% of the 
                                                                                                     
 151. See id. at 28 (“Investors querying BrokerCheck only see information on 
one broker at a time and so do not know whether a broker’s reported 
characteristics are unusual . . . .”). 
 152. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Exam Scores and Failures Belong on 
BrokerCheck, INVESTMENTNEWS (June 1, 2014, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20140601/REG/140539987/exam-scores-
and-failures-belong-on-brokercheck (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (“A fierce 
struggle continues . . . over whether . . . BrokerCheck website should give 
investors a full view or a sanitized and less salient version of a broker’s 
background.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 153. Jean Eaglesham & Rob Barry, Wall Street’s Watchdog Doesn’t Disclose 
All Regulatory Red Flags: Finra Doesn’t Make Public All Its Information About 
Brokers, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2014, 9:47 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-
streets-watchdog-doesnt-disclose-all-regulatory-red-flags-1419645494 (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 154. See id. (reporting the investigation’s findings). 
 155. See Christine Lazaro, Has Expungement Broken Brokercheck?, 14 J. BUS. 
& SEC. L. 125, 131–32 (2014) (“[A] broker may also seek to expunge customer 
dispute information from the CRD system through court or the arbitration 
process.”(citation omitted)). 
 156. See Notice to Arbitrators and Parties on Expanded Expungement 
Guidance, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/notice-
arbitrators-and-parties-expanded-expungement-guidance (last updated Sept. 
2017) (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (“Expungement is an extraordinary remedy that 
should be recommended only under appropriate circumstances.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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time when a party requested expungement after settling a 
complaint.157 
These expungements make it possible for troubled brokers to 
cause significant harm to consumers. For example, one broker, 
Carl Martellaro, operated his own broker-dealer firm.158 After two 
investors filed arbitrations seeking to recover for $1.75 million in 
losses, Mr. Martellaro settled the cases—with the condition that 
the investors not oppose Mr. Martellaro’s request to expunge the 
record of the action.159 The investors’ attorney, Scott Bernstein, 
explained that although his clients “cut a deal, . . . the public got 
cut out.”160 With information about the prior action suppressed, 
Mr. Martellaro went on to bilk investors out of $125 million in 
another Ponzi scheme.161  
2. The Flawed Occupational Licensing Model 
Self-regulating professions often defend occupational licensing 
by arguing that it protects the public from abuse and exploitation 
when market forces fail.162 Under this line of thinking, the public 
cannot protect itself or regulate the profession because only 
appropriately qualified members of the profession have the 
capacity to understand or regulate it.163 More skeptical voices raise 
                                                                                                     
 157. See Seth E. Lipner, The Expungement of Customer Complaint CRD 
Information Following the Settlement of A FINRA Arbitration, 19 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 57, 92 (2013) (“[T]he expungement rate was 93.66%.”). 
 158. Michael Freedman, The X-ed Out Files, FORBES (Dec. 25, 2000, 12:00 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2000/1225/6616280a.html (last visited Sept. 
21, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 159. See id. (“The awards stipulated that all references to the arbitration be 
expunged.”). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Licensing laws make it illegal to engage in a form of work without the 
appropriate governmental or quasi-governmental authorization. See Paul J. 
Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 209, 210–11 (2016) (“Licensing laws make it unlawful, and sometimes 
illegal, to practice in a particular field without first receiving the government’s 
approval.”). 
 163. See Gordon, supra note 25, at 1430 (“The theory behind self-regulation is 
that the quality of professional services, requiring as they do complex technical 
knowledge and discretionary judgment, cannot be reliably evaluated by clients or 
by lay auditors or regulators.”). 
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concerns about whether the current structures for professional 
self-regulation truly serve the public’s interests. In many 
instances, occupational licensing devolves into economic 
protectionism and fails to deliver promised public protections. In 
many instances, self-regulation may offer mixed benefits and 
burdens. Carefully crafted disclosure regimes may mitigate the 
dark sides of self-regulation. 
a. Cartelization Risks 
Professional self-regulation creates an inherent and 
ever-present risk of cartelization.164 This occurs when a profession 
acts more in its own interest than in the interest of the public.165 
Law, medicine, and finance may all be prone to cartel-like 
behaviors.166 
Consider the ways attorney self-regulation exhibits a tendency 
toward self-interested over public-minded behavior.167 
Professional barriers to entry apply before anyone may provide 
even a limited amount of legal services. To obtain a law license a 
person must complete a college degree, a law degree, and pass a 
multi-day bar examination.168 While this may increase the 
likelihood of competent practice, this also insulates the practicing 
bar from competition. 
Many bar association rules seem more designed to restrain 
competition between lawyers than to protect the public.169 For 
example, Alabama requires attorneys to include the following 
disclaimer when advertising: “No representation is made that the 
quality of the legal services to be performed is greater than the 
                                                                                                     
 164. See Edlin & Haw,  supra note 20, at 1107 (“But while some professions 
may require restrictions to ensure quality and public safety, a close examination 
of restrictions in those professions suggests that those boards, too, have abused 
their ability to self-regulate.”). 
 165. Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 24. 
 166. Edlin & Haw, supra note 20, at 1107. 
 167. See Jonathan Macey, Occupation Code 541110: Lawyers, 
Self-Regulation, and the Idea of a Profession, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1079, 1096 
(2005) (“Legal self-regulation displays the typical self-interested behavior of a 
cartel without any of the concomitant benefits . . . .”). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Edlin & Haw, supra note 20, at 1108–09. 
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quality of legal services performed by other lawyers.”170 These 
restrictions make it difficult for lawyers to differentiate 
themselves. 
b. Limited Review of Ongoing Competence 
Professional regulatory bodies may man the gates, but they 
often avert their gaze from activities beyond licensing’s wall. After 
lawyers pass through a state’s bar exam and character and fitness 
requirements, they rarely face any further competency review. In 
many instances, state bars do not allocate substantial resources to 
their enforcement staff to investigate complaints.171  
Similarly, many financial advisers operate with limited 
regulatory oversight. For example, registered investment advisers 
(RIA)172 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act) 
rarely face ongoing reviews of their practices.173 Although the SEC 
remains responsible for RIA examinations, its limited resources 
allow it to review an RIA’s operations about once every eleven 
years.174 
Failing to adequately oversee RIAs may generate substantial 
risk. While the SEC’s examinations of RIA practices have declined, 
the assets managed by RIAs have swelled—as of 2012, RIAs 
managed $38.3 trillion in assets.175 Despite the infrequent 
examinations, misconduct rates may be rising—the SEC has 
                                                                                                     
 170. ALA. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT 7.2(e). 
 171. See Gordon, supra note 25, at 1431 (“[T]he bar has spectacularly failed 
to do its job. In most states it does not finance or staff more than a tiny fraction 
of the administrative machinery that would be needed to handle client complaints 
effectively . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 172. The statute defines a registered investment adviser as “any person who, 
for compensation, engages in the business of advising others . . . as to the value 
of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling 
securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or 
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities.” 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) 
(2012). 
 173. DIV. OF INV. MGMT. OF THE U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON 
ENHANCING INVESTMENT ADVISER EXAMINATIONS 14 (2011). 
 174. See id. (explaining that with the SEC’s limited resources, “the average 
registered adviser could expect to be examined less than once every 11 years”). 
 175. Id. at 9. 
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begun to bring more and more enforcement actions against 
RIAs.176 
These failures show that licensing bodies often fail to monitor 
professional practice in any meaningful way. They may respond to 
complaints, but they will only rarely proactively seek to identify 
incompetent or substandard professionals. A Professional 
Prospectus regime would amplify market forces and supplement 
self-regulatory enforcement.  
III. A Professional Prospectus 
Disclosure-based solutions often improve market functioning 
by reducing transaction costs for market participants. Still, 
disclosures must be carefully designed, appropriately tailored and 
delivered to aid consumer choice.177 While the appropriate 
disclosure regime will vary depending on the professional services 
market, some essential attributes may increase the likelihood that 
the information will be used effectively. 
A well-crafted disclosure system would supplement 
professional self-regulation by allowing market forces to vigorously 
police professional ranks. More informed selection decisions could 
shift demand away from the less competent—giving them an 
economic incentive to improve their client or patient outcomes.  
                                                                                                     
 176. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Challenge of Fiduciary Regulation: The 
Investment Advisers Act After Seventy-Five Years, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. 
L. 405, 433 (2016) (“SEC enforcement actions against advisers became even more 
widespread.”). 
 177. Cf. Susanna Kim Ripken, Predictions, Projections, and Precautions: 
Conveying Cautionary Warnings in Corporate Forward-Looking Statements, 2005 
U. ILL. L. REV. 929, 977 (“[T]he focus should be on how to communicate forward-
looking information and future risks to unsophisticated investors in a meaningful 
way, perhaps some of the previous insights gleaned from the psychological 
research regarding the effective design of warnings in the consumer products 
market may be helpful.”). 
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A. Key Considerations for a Professional Prospectus Regime 
1. Moving from Posting to Pushing 
For a Professional Prospectus system to alter market function, 
consumers will need to receive the information before they make a 
firm commitment to a professional.178 Achieving this requires 
advancing beyond posting public information in accessible 
locations to pushing the information to consumers. 
a. Today’s Posting 
At present, many professional organizations do significant 
good by posting information about their members to their websites. 
In the legal profession, state bars allow the public to retrieve 
information about individual attorneys through the state bar’s 
website. For example, the Florida Bar makes basic information 
about attorneys available.179 It tells the public that a person should 
“[m]ake a careful search for [a] lawyer; it’s an important 
decision.”180 The Florida Bar’s guidance also explains how a 
consumer can check a lawyer’s disciplinary history—presumably 
because the disciplinary history provides a meaningful signal to 
the public.181 
State bars may improve consumer decisions by publishing 
information about attorney discipline because previously 
disciplined attorneys may be more likely to have future 
misconduct.182 While lawyer recidivism has not been extensively 
studied, the available evidence indicates that lawyers with public 
                                                                                                     
 178. Cf. Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private 
Ordering of Public Elections, 126 YALE L.J. 262 (2016) (pointing out that voters 
need information on corporate political spending before an election to take it into 
account). 
 179. How To Find A Lawyer in Florida Pamphlet, FLORIDA BAR, 
https://www.floridabar.org/public/consumer/pamphlet018/ (last visited Sept. 21, 
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 2 (2007) (“It is no secret that some lawyers who have been 
sanctioned continue to engage in misconduct . . . .”). 
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discipline appear more likely to have future discipline than other 
lawyers.183 
Financial regulators also post information about financial 
advisers on the theory that the public should take the information 
into account.184 For example, FINRA explains that the public 
should use its BrokerCheck website because it helps consumers 
“make informed choices about brokers and brokerage firms and 
provides easy access to investment adviser information.”185  
In the financial advice context, evidence indicates that 
advisers with past complaints pose greater threats to the public 
than advisers without past complaints. In one recent study, 
economists found that a financial adviser with past misconduct 
was “five times as likely to engage in new misconduct as the 
average financial adviser.”186 Given the heightened risks posed by 
brokers with misconduct histories, publicly posting this 
information does significant good.  
b. The Power of Pushing 
Professional licensing bodies have accepted the premise that 
consumers should use information about professional service 
providers to make decisions. In public guidance materials, they 
explain that consumers should consider disclosed information 
when selecting a professional service provider.187 Presumably, 
professional regulatory bodies would not go to the trouble of 
collecting and posting information if they did not believe that 
consumers could benefit from the information. 
                                                                                                     
 183. See id. (same). 
 184. While the current disclosure system for financial advisers has significant 
flaws as discussed above, it does make some information available to the public.  
 185. BrokerCheck by FINRA, FINRA, https://brokercheck.finra.org/ (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 186. Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos & Amit Seru, The Market for Financial 
Adviser Misconduct 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2739170 (last visited Sept. 
21, 2017) [hereinafter Egan, Matvos & Seru] (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 187. See, e.g., supra note 179 and accompanying text (encouraging consumers 
to carefully evaluate their prospective attorneys). 
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Unfortunately, many consumers lack awareness of these 
resources or do not think to consult them when selecting a 
professional.188 Professional bodies have even created advertising 
campaigns to increase awareness. Speaking about one campaign, 
former FINRA Chairman Richard Ketchum explained that 
“[p]eople immediately go online to check out a new restaurant 
where they might spend $25 for a meal, but don’t think to use 
BrokerCheck when they’re handing over $2,500—or 
$25,000 . . . . That has to change.”189  
Pushing information to consumers may improve market 
functioning by amplifying the broadcast channel created by 
posting information.190 Instead of assuming that consumers know 
enough to perform their own rudimentary due diligence, a 
Professional Prospectus regime would require professional service 
providers to deliver partial disclosures on first contact and at 
regular intervals. Ensuring that consumers receive information 
increases the likelihood that they will be able to take it into 
account.  
A well-designed Professional Prospectus regime would put 
useful information into consumer hands. Whenever possible 
clients should receive disclosures about a professional before 
beginning any engagement and at regular intervals for prolonged 
engagements.191 Ideally, the public should be given an opportunity 
                                                                                                     
 188. For a discussion of underutilization of information resources in the 
health context, see Mello & Brennan, supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text. 
 189. FINRA Launches National Ad Campaign Promoting Brokercheck, 
FINRA (June 1, 2015), http://www.finra.org/newsroom/2015/finra-launches-
national-ad-campaign-promoting-brokercheck (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 190. In discussing the limited utility of posting information on BrokerCheck, 
one consumer advocate argued that it would make more sense to simply “provide 
the information . . . directly in the form of a plain English pre-engagement 
disclosure document so that investors don’t have to go searching for such critically 
important information.” Ted Knutson, Finra Kicking Off $3.5 Million 
BrokerCheck Ad Campaign, FA MAG. (June 1, 2015), http://www.fa-
mag.com/news/finra-kicking-off--3-5-million-brokercheck-ad-campaign-21973. 
html (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (quoting Barbara Roper) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 191. After the initial decision and an investment in a relationship, consumers 
may be much less likely to change from this initial state. Cf. Jill Fraley, The 
Meaning of Dispossession 12–13 (Wash. & Lee Pub. Legal Studies, Working Paper 
No. 2017–1, Jan. 25, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2905798 (describing human unwillingness to change after an 
1496 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1457 (2017) 
to read and review the disclosures before proceeding. This could be 
accomplished by requiring that a professional first provide a copy 
of the disclosures whenever a new client meets with the 
professional. 
Pushing should be preferred over posting for high-stakes 
professional services because it puts useful information directly 
into the consumer’s hands.192 The current “posting” model relies on 
weak assumptions that consumers: (i) know that useful, public 
information about professionals has been posted to a professional 
self-regulatory website; and (ii) that they will remember to review 
the information.  
Adopting a preference for pushing over only posting 
information will do significant good. While not every consumer will 
closely review the information, enough will likely change behavior 
to increase overall market efficiency. This will also increase 
reputation’s force in shaping the professional services markets by 
significantly amplifying the broadcast channel for relevant 
information. 
2. Short, Standardized, & Clear 
Designing a Professional Prospectus regime requires informed 
choices about how to present useful information. The most benefits 
seem likely to emerge from presenting the information in a short, 
standardized, and clear format.  
a. Short 
It would be a mistake to assume that if some immediate 
disclosure does good, more would be better.193 For some time, it has 
been accepted that flooding consumers with tangentially relevant 
                                                                                                     
investment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 192. The costs associated with this proposal are discussed in Part III, infra. 
 193. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its 
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 419 (2003) 
(explaining that “[s]tudies show that at some point, people become overloaded 
with information and make worse decisions than if less information were made 
available to them”). 
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information does not improve decision-making.194 Giving 
consumers too much information may distract them with 
irrelevant information and lead to poorer decisions.195  
An effective prospectus regime will strike an optimal balance 
between volume and utilization. As documents grow longer, the 
task of reading them both appears and grows more burdensome. If 
research reveals that most consumers will not review more than a 
single page disclosure, the disclosure distributed at the point of 
contact should be limited to a single page. 
Of course, the introduction of a Professional Prospectus 
regime does not mean that professional bodies should post less 
information on their websites. Information that cannot be included 
in a Professional Prospectus should remain readily available. The 
shorter disclosure would communicate key facts and notify the 
recipient about the availability of additional information. 
In some respects, the wisest structure may partially resemble 
the disclosure structure used for mutual funds.196 A mutual fund’s 
“summary prospectus” provides “information that the SEC views 
as most important” including, among other things, information 
about cost, investment strategies, risks, and information about 
compensation paid to financial intermediaries.197 The full 
prospectus provides additional information. 
b. Standardized 
Standard disclosure requirements may improve market 
functioning by increasing the ability of consumers to compare one 
professional against another. Without a standardized disclosure 
                                                                                                     
 194. See Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure 
Antidote: Toward A More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 
BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 146–47 (2006) (“[D]isclosure that is too long or complex to be 
comprehensible to the average person floods the individual with too much 
nonessential data and overloads the person with information that inhibits 
optimal decision-making.”). 
 195. See id. at 160–61 (summarizing research). 
 196. See Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1968–69 (2010) (describing mutual fund prospectuses). 
 197. Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for 
Registered Open-End Management Investment Companies, Securities Act 
Release No. 8998, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,584, 74 Fed. Reg. 
4546, 4552 (Jan. 26, 2009) (codified at scattered parts of 17 C.F.R). 
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format, consumers struggle to use the information to compare one 
professional to another.198 Consider the comparison difficulties 
created if health professionals were permitted to define 
“complication” in different ways. One might only include shock and 
hemorrhage while another might include a broader array of 
complications. Different definitions would make it difficult for 
consumers to understand actual differences in complication rates. 
c. Clear 
An effective Professional Prospectus regime will also convey 
information clearly and plainly. Unlike securities disclosure, 
which may be designed more for a professional audience, there 
should be no doubt that a Professional Prospectus regime seeks to 
deliver information directly to public consumers.199 Given the need 
to reach the public, disclosures should be written in clear and 
simple language. 
3. Benchmark Information 
A Professional Prospectus should provide information as well 
as any useful context that will allow consumers to evaluate the 
information. Consider the difficulty of assessing the relative 
danger posed by a broker with two customer complaints on her 
record. Without context, a consumer may have no way to know 
whether most brokers have two or more complaints.  
Mutual fund disclosures suffer from a similar problem.200 
While a mutual fund prospectus provides fee disclosure, it does not 
                                                                                                     
 198. A similar dynamic exists in the securities markets. See STEPHEN J. CHOI 
& A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & ANALYSIS 25 (4th ed. 2015) 
(“Comparisons are more difficult if disclosures are not consistent.”). 
 199. See David Crump, Against Plain English: The Case for a Functional 
Approach to Legal Document Preparation, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 713, 716 (2002) (“The 
advisability of insisting on plain English depends upon the type of document at 
issue. If the function of the document requires quick apprehension, plain English 
is important.”). 
 200. See Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management 
Regulation, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 521, 546–47 (2009)  
[W]hile settling on a uniform presentation of fee information is useful 
because it facilitates comparison, the rules do not help investors with 
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provide critical context. While a 2% fee might seem small for a 
mutual fund, it falls on the pricier end of the scale. Many funds 
charge substantially less for their asset management services. A 
consumer reviewing a single prospectus lacks critical context that 
may only come from benchmark information or from reviewing a 
sizeable sample of prospectuses.  
Still, selecting the relevant benchmark may be challenging. 
Consider the difficulty of selecting a relevant benchmark for 
criminal defense attorneys. Criminal defense lawyers tend to 
receive substantially more complaints about their services than 
other lawyers. Benchmarking their disclosures against statistics 
for attorneys generally may mislead clients about their attorney. 
To deal with the problem, a Professional Prospectus regime should 
benchmark by relevant specialty whenever possible. 
Without the context provided by benchmark information, a 
Professional Prospectus may fail to alert many consumers of 
situations where they should grow wary. The alert provided by a 
benchmark may nudge consumers into more closely monitoring a 
professional service provider. 
4. Information with Predictive Value 
While the precise disclosures should vary depending on 
market, an effective Professional Prospectus regime will 
prominently feature information with some predictive value. 
Featuring information with known predictive value may aid 
consumers and reduce the likelihood that they will base decisions 
on irrelevant information. 
Information that has predictive value in one context may not 
have predictive value in others. For example, information about 
customer complaints and past misconduct has proven to contain 
predictive value for financial advisers.201 Because complaint 
information provides a meaningful signal about outcomes, it 
                                                                                                     
the crucial next step—they never give investors an idea of how a fund’s 
fees compare to other funds. Instead, investors are left to fend for 
themselves in this regard.  
 201. See generally Egan, Matvos & Seru, supra note 186 (finding that 
stockbrokers with misconduct histories are five times more likely to have future 
complaints). 
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should be featured in a Professional Prospectus for financial 
advisers. Complaints may fall along a continuum for different 
professions. For financial advisers, the mere filing of a complaint 
seemingly provides statistically significant information about risk. 
Similarly, a small percentage of physicians “account for a 
disproportionate share of malpractice claims, settlements, and 
judgments.”202 When complaint information provides a meaningful 
signal about outcomes, it should be disclosed to consumers. 
This does not mean that all complaint information about all 
professionals should be featured on a Professional Prospectus. 
Without evidence that complaint information provides a 
meaningful signal, there may be no reason to believe that the 
inclusion of the information would improve overall market 
function. 
Nonetheless, identifying predictive information may require 
additional analysis and research.203 In the market for attorney 
services, research now indicates that information collected 
through the legal profession’s character and fitness process 
provides only marginal predictive value, at best.204 Practice setting 
may offer some predictive value because bar authorities discipline 
solo practitioners at higher rates than attorneys that practice 
within larger firms.205 Assembling effective disclosures may 
require more research to identify factors that indicate poorer 
outcomes. 
Predictive information may be most readily accessible in the 
medical context.206 When medical professionals specialize and 
                                                                                                     
 202. See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care 
Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the 
Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 990 (2005) (citing statistical research). 
 203. Cf. David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and Efforts to Encourage 
Healthy Choices by Individuals, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1637, 1658 (2014) (“Governments 
need to do a better job at making sure their interventions reflect current scientific 
understanding, and they need to ensure that more research is conducted to 
improve our understanding.”). 
 204. See Leslie C. Levin et al., The Questionable Character of the Bar’s 
Character and Fitness Inquiry, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 51, 52 (2015) 
(“Surprisingly, however, it is unclear whether the data gathered during the 
character inquiry actually predict lawyer misconduct.”). 
 205. See Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm 
Practitioners, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 309, 312 (2004) (“Solo and small firm lawyers are 
disciplined at a far greater rate than other lawyers.”). 
 206. See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in 
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perform the same or similar procedures repeatedly, statistical 
information about patient outcomes emerges. If a doctor lacks 
experience in a procedure or has abnormally poor outcomes, a 
patient may not actually give informed consent without receiving 
information about the doctor’s lack of experience and outcomes.207 
5. Insurance Information 
Many states already require professionals to disclose 
information about whether they carry malpractice insurance. 
Giving consumers ready access to this information may improve 
market functioning in key ways. If consumers shift toward 
professionals with insurance, it increases the likelihood that they 
will be able to recoup a portion of their losses if they receive 
substandard services. If the disclosure regime causes more 
professionals to obtain insurance, the insurance company’s rates 
may force professionals to internalize malpractice risks. 
B. An Immigration Use Case 
Immigration court practice provides an initial use case to test 
the efficacy of a Professional Prospectus regime. While 
self-regulating professions may hesitate to impose disclosure 
regimes on their members, a federal agency might more readily 
move to impose disclosure requirements on persons practicing 
within its administrative courts. Improving the legal services 
market for immigration lawyers could unlock significant gains for 
immigrant families, lawyers, and society. 
                                                                                                     
Informed Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3 
(1999) (“With the advent of more extensive gathering and comparison of data, it 
has become possible to provide information to patients not only about the risks 
associated with the procedures for which consent was sought, but also about the 
relative risks associated with the medical providers [performing] those 
procedures.”). 
 207. See Johnson ex rel. Adler v. Kokemoor, 199 Wis. 2d 615, 644 (1996) (“Had 
a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position been made aware that being 
operated upon by the defendant significantly increased the risk one would have 
faced in the hands of another surgeon . . . that person might well have elected to 
forego surgery with the defendant.”).  
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1. The State of Representation 
Representation significantly influences outcomes in 
immigration courts. At present, the market for immigration 
lawyers fails to deliver in terms of quantity and quality.208  
a. Insufficient Representation Rates 
In many instances, persons facing immigration removal 
proceedings go forward without the assistance of a 
representative.209 While the figures vary from year to year, only a 
limited portion of those in removal proceedings had the assistance 
of an attorney.210 Between 2007 and 2012, only 37% of persons in 
removal proceedings had representation.211 
Representation strongly correlates with improved outcomes in 
immigration court proceedings.212 One recent nationwide study 
found that respondents with representation were five and a half 
times more likely to obtain relief than respondents without 
representation.213 This recent figure coheres with other analyses 
that have found significant differences in outcomes for represented 
versus unrepresented parties. In asylum cases, one study found 
that “[r]epresented asylum seekers were granted asylum at a rate 
                                                                                                     
 208. See Robert A. Katzmann, Foreword, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 332 (2011) 
(“The representation problem, nationally, is two-fold: (1) the fact that only forty 
percent of noncitizens have representation nationwide; and (2) the substandard 
quality of counsel in all too many cases, which all but dooms the immigrant’s 
chances even in the cases of those who do have nominal representation.”). 
 209. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., FY 2014 
STATISTICS YEARBOOK F1 fig.10 (Mar. 2015), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/ 
attachments/2015/03/16/fy14syb.pdf. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel 
in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2015). 
 212. See id. at 57 (“In short, at every stage in immigration court proceedings, 
representation was associated with dramatically more successful case outcomes 
for immigrant respondents.”). 
 213. See id. at 76 (“Our regression analysis, which controlled for numerous 
case- and respondent-specific characteristics, reported this result most 
dramatically: the odds were fifteen times greater that immigrants with 
representation, as compared to those without, sought relief, and five-and-a-half 
times greater that they obtained relief.”). 
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of 45.6%, almost three times as high as the 16.3% grant rate for 
those without legal counsel.”214 
Of course, factors other than representation quality may 
account for some of the outcome differences between represented 
and unrepresented respondents.215 Perhaps only the most 
motivated may seek representation, indicating a client’s will to 
fight removal—a will that may be forged by fear of returning to a 
country where she will face persecution.216 Some differences in 
outcomes may also reflect attorneys and nonprofits picking the 
best cases and only representing persons with reasonable 
probabilities of success.217 
Even if other factors partially account for the differences, the 
different outcomes for represented and unrepresented respondents 
show the need for counsel in immigration court removal 
proceedings.218 Despite this, federal law forbids appointing counsel 
at the government’s expense.219 In the current environment, a 
right to appointed counsel for immigration matters does not 
appear likely to emerge from court decisions or Congress soon.220  
b. Low Lawyer Quality 
In addition to an overall shortage of representations, 
immigration court representation also suffers from quality 
problems.221 One study of immigration practice in New York found 
                                                                                                     
 214. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum 
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 340 (2007) [hereinafter Refugee Roulette]. 
 215. See D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized 
Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and 
Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2188–96 (2012) (discussing selection 
effects). 
 216. See id. (same). 
 217. See id. (same). 
 218. See Eagly & Shafer, supra note 211, at 3 (illustrating the scope of 
underrepresentation in immigration court). 
 219. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(a) (2012) (“[T]he alien shall have the privilege of 
being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s 
choosing who is authorized to practice in such proceedings . . . .”). 
 220. Cf. Anne R. Traum, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law on Its Own 
Path, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 491, 547 (2011) (arguing that a Padilla-based rationale 
for immigration counsel “does not appear imminent”). 
 221. See Elinor R. Jordan, What We Know and Need to Know About 
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that immigration judges rated nearly half of immigration lawyers 
as substandard, with 33% of practitioners rated as inadequate and 
another 14% as grossly inadequate.222 These findings cohere with 
other reports which have characterized many immigration counsel 
as “barely adequate” at their jobs.223 A survey of judges found that 
“immigration was the area in which the quality of representation 
was lowest.”224 
The quality of service provided by immigration lawyers varies 
widely. The private immigration bar accounts for 91% of all 
representation and provides significantly lower quality than other 
representatives.225 In contrast, nonprofits and law school clinics 
generally provide higher quality representation.226 In one study, 
larger law firms providing pro bono services won an astounding 
96% of their cases.227 
                                                                                                     
Immigrant Access to Justice, 67 S.C. L. REV. 295, 299–300 (2016) (“Elsewhere, 
scholars have similarly found that nearly half of removal-case representation is 
inadequate.”). 
 222. See Symposium, Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of 
Counsel in Removal Proceedings New York Immigrant Representation Study 
Report: Part 1, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 364 (2011) [hereinafter Accessing Justice] 
(“New York immigration judges rated nearly half of all legal representatives as 
less than adequate in terms of overall performance; 33% were rated as inadequate 
and an additional 14% were rated as grossly inadequate.”). 
 223. FELINDA MOTTINO, MOVING FORWARD: THE ROLE OF LEGAL COUNSEL IN 
NEW YORK CITY IMMIGRATION COURTS 38 (2000), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-
web-assets/downloads/Publications/moving-forward-the-role-of-legal-counsel-in-new-
york-city-immigration-courts/legacy_downloads/353.409747_MF.pdf; see also Robert 
A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 
21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3, 9 (2008) (“Often times, the reviewing appellate judge, 
who is constrained at the time the case comes before her, is left with the feeling 
that if only the immigrant had secured adequate representation at the outset, the 
outcome might have been different.”). 
 224. Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality 
of Legal Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 330 (2011). 
 225. See Accessing Justice, supra note 222, at 364 (“The epicenter of the 
quality problem is in the private bar, which accounts for 91% of all representation 
and, according to the immigration judges surveyed, is of significantly lower 
quality than pro bono, nonprofit, and law school-clinic providers.”). 
 226. See id. (same).  
 227. See Refugee Roulette, supra note 214, at 341 (“[A]sylum applicants 
represented pro bono by large law firms cooperating with Human Rights First 
(formerly the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights) had a success rate of about 
96% in the 479 cases they handled to conclusion in that same period.”). 
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One recent, peer-reviewed study examined the differences in 
outcomes for immigration clients represented by attorneys with 
different track records before certain judges and found striking 
differences in outcomes.228 The study broke attorneys into three 
categories by win rates: (i) poor attorneys in the bottom 10th 
percentile with less than 4% win rates; (ii) average attorneys at the 
50th percentile winning about 24% before a particular judge; and 
(iii) good attorneys at the 90th percentile that won 60% or better 
before a particular judge.229 Startlingly, the study found that 
“having no attorney is consistently more beneficial than having a 
low quality attorney.”230 Average attorneys provide some benefit 
and increase client odds to “about 9 percentage points better than 
no attorney.”231 Representation quality makes a significant 
difference with good attorneys performing on “average 32 
percentage points better than an average one and about 40 
percentage points better than no representation.”232 
2. The Lemon Problem Limits Market Solutions 
The private immigration bar’s low quality drives a lemon 
problem. A lemon problem can arise when sellers of goods or 
services have more information than buyers.233 If buyers cannot 
tell whether they are purchasing a higher quality good or service, 
they will only pay for an average-priced good or service. This 
means that the producers of higher-quality goods or services will 
not be compensated fairly. High-quality providers will either 
reduce the quality of their offerings or compete in a different 
                                                                                                     
 228. See Banks Miller, Linda Camp Keith & Jennifer S. Holmes, Leveling the 
Odds: The Effect of Quality Legal Representation in Cases of Asymmetrical 
Capability, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 209, 210 (2015) [hereinafter Leveling the Odds] 
(“[V]ariation in attorney capability is a primary driver of the disparity in asylum 
outcomes in U.S. immigration courts.”). 
 229. Id. at 229. 
 230. Id. at 230. 
 231. Id. at 229. 
 232. Id. 
 233. See Akerloff, Lemons, supra note 18, at 489–90 and accompanying text 
(noting the less-informed buyer’s disadvantage). 
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market.234 A lemon problem can both degrade the average quality 
of services and the amount of services available.235 
In the market for immigration lawyers, a significant 
information asymmetry exists—the lowest quality immigration 
lawyers know that they do not win their cases but their clients do 
not.236 In many instances, “immigrants are simply in a terrible 
position to evaluate the claims made by lawyers and are often 
naïve about what lawyers can and cannot do for them.”237 
Immigrants may also hesitate to express concerns because of 
status differences between them and their attorneys.  
This lemon problem may be especially pronounced in 
immigration courts because ordinary reputational feedback 
mechanisms may function with less force in immigration cases. 
When a client loses a case because of low-quality lawyering, the 
client does not remain in the community to spread word about the 
attorney’s behavior. It may be particularly difficult to file 
complaints and grievances after deportation. 
Importantly, this lemon problem makes it more difficult to 
keep higher quality lawyers in immigration court practice. 
Consider the difficulty faced by a highly competent immigration 
lawyer. If clients cannot tell the difference between good lawyering 
and bad, they will not be more likely to hire the good lawyer. This 
means that the good lawyer will face an ever-present incentive to 
either shirk her responsibilities because hard work does little for 
her career or to shift her practice to other areas.238 As this cycle 
repeats, the current, private immigration law bar develops and the 
                                                                                                     
 234. Id. 
 235. See id. at 495 (explaining that “dishonest dealings tend to drive honest 
dealings out of the market” and that “[t]he cost of dishonesty, therefore, lies not 
only in the amount by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost must also include 
the loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence”). 
 236. The best available evidence indicates that persons in removal 
proceedings struggle to identify higher quality lawyers. If the market could 
effectively price immigration law services, it seems unlikely that respondents 
would hire lawyers that reduced their chances below their expected outcome of 
proceeding without representation. For further discussion, see Leveling the Odds, 
supra note 228, at 229. 
 237. Id. at 213. 
 238. This, of course, assumes that the lawyer has some interest in making 
money. 
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overall size of the market diminishes because clients become less 
willing to pay.239  
This dynamic may also explain why law school clinics and pro 
bono lawyers achieve relatively higher success rates. Their service 
quality does not depend on the market’s ability to support their 
practice. 
3. A Professional Prospectus Intervention 
There are different mechanisms for addressing information 
asymmetry and lemon problems.240 For example, licensing has 
been used to “reduce quality uncertainty” in the markets for 
professional services.241 Given the private immigration bar’s low 
quality, it appears that the licensing model may either need to 
impose a higher standard or embrace additional solutions.242 
Mandatory disclosure through a Professional Prospectus for 
regular immigration court practitioners would improve market 
functioning.243 The disclosure enables immigration lawyers to 
make more credible statements about their relative skill to 
potential clients.244 It also gives the least sophisticated consumers 
of legal services a tool for assessing the relative competency of their 
representatives. Ready access to this information would likely 
make clients more sophisticated consumers of legal services.  
                                                                                                     
 239. Of course, respondents in removal proceedings face more barriers than 
an unwillingness to pay for uncertain services. They may simply not have the 
money. In many instances, the breakdown of trust in immigration attorneys may 
undercut the ability of respondents to borrow funds from friends, families, and 
financial intermediaries.  
 240. For a discussion on the different mechanisms, see Akerloff, Lemons, 
supra note 18, at 499–500. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Cf. Shubha Ghosh, Decentering the Consuming Self: Personalized 
Medicine, Science, and the Market for Lemons, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 299, 
302 (2015) (“What should be emphasized is that there are several solutions to the 
lemons problem.”). 
 243. It would be reasonable to implement a Professional Prospectus 
requirement only for attorneys with a statistically significant sample of cases. 
 244. See Ghosh, supra note 242, at 302 (“[S]uppliers need to be able to make 
credible statements about product quality so that consumers will be able to 
identify the level of quality they seek for the product.”). 
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Adding a Professional Prospectus requirement for 
immigration court practice would be feasible. Immigration courts 
already require attorneys to complete a form with each notice of 
appearance.245 The Department of Justice can aggregate 
information about attorneys regularly practicing in its courts and 
generate Professional Prospectuses at lower cost than other 
potential solutions.246 Much of the information and relevant 
statistical models for a Professional Prospectus may already be 
available from academic research.247 
Certifying that an attorney provided the disclosures would not 
be overly difficult. The Department of Justice could require an 
attorney to certify that the client received the disclosure at the 
outset of the representation when filing a notice of appearance, and 
immigration court judges could verify that the client had received 
it when accepting the representative’s appearance.  
Significant social benefits should also emerge from improving 
the market for immigration law services. It costs approximately 
$158 per day to detain immigrants in removal proceedings.248 If 
improved representation makes it possible to detain fewer 
immigrants or to detain them for shorter periods of time, the 
change could result in significant social savings.249 
                                                                                                     
 245. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NOTICE OF ENTRY OF APPEARANCE AS ATTORNEY 
OR REPRESENTATIVE BEFORE THE IMMIGRATION COURT 1–2 (2015) (showing the 
Agency’s “Form EOIR – 28”). 
 246. While a right to counsel in immigration court would do significant good, 
a Professional Prospectus intervention requires less resources to implement and 
may not require Congressional action because the Department of Justice has the 
ability to regulate the conduct of attorneys practicing within its courts. Moreover, 
testing the concept would not require nationwide implementation—the 
Department of Justice could experiment with it in a few regions before 
determining whether it offered benefits outweighing the costs.  
 247. See generally Leveling the Odds, supra note 228. 
 248. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION: 
IMPROVED DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS NEEDED TO BETTER ASSESS PROGRAM 
EFFECTIVENESS 18–19 (2014). 
 249. Immigrants would also benefit significantly from better advice. When a 
substandard attorney creates false hope and files a meritless asylum claim, the 
immigrant may lose months of their life to detention in order to pursue a doomed 
asylum claim.   
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IV. Implications of a Professional Prospectus Regime 
Moving toward a disclosure-incorporating regime for 
professional services may alter the way market participants 
behave. This Part discusses some of the objections to, and 
implications of, a Professional Prospectus regime. 
A. Potential Objections 
1. Disclosure Costs 
One objection to any mandatory disclosure regime is that 
mandated disclosures impose costs on the persons required to 
make the disclosures. A Professional Prospectus regime may 
require professionals to gather, produce, and maintain records 
about their practices. These burdensome requirements may 
increase the cost of professional services because professionals will 
be forced to charge higher prices to comply with these 
requirements. 
While any disclosure-based regime should keep a close eye on 
the costs imposed, mandatory disclosure may reduce overall social 
costs. If the disclosure requirements simply mandate that the 
professional present otherwise public information, forcing 
disclosure reduces public search costs and the need for many 
different members of the public to perform costly and duplicative 
research. Instead of having one person gather the information, 
every client that conducts rudimentary due diligence will expend 
time and effort to gather the information.  
In most instances, a professional may also be the lowest-cost 
producer of information about themselves.250 Unlike members of 
the public with little information about what information may be 
available, professionals already know the types of information 
available. Unlike professionals, members of the public incur two 
sets of costs when performing due diligence—the cost of first 
determining the kinds of information that should be reviewed, and 
the additional cost of gathering that information about a 
professional. If a member of the public cannot pay these costs when 
                                                                                                     
 250. For immigration attorneys, the lowest cost producer may be the 
Department of Justice. 
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selecting a professional, they accept additional risk and pay a cost 
in outcomes and quality. 
The cost may also be justified to the extent that it generates 
incremental improvements in the markets for professional 
services. As discussed above, these markets now fail to function 
effectively and impose tremendous costs on society. Even though a 
move to embrace effective disclosure structures will impose costs 
on some professionals, it offers a substantial improvement over the 
status quo.251 
2. Pandering 
A disclosure system may change behavior. Some may fear that 
a Professional Prospectus regime might cause professionals to 
pander to avoid complaints instead of delivering hard news. If 
professionals fear the economic impact of a complaint on their 
reputational capital, they may alter their practices to avoid 
complaints in ways that diminish client or patient outcomes.  
A well-designed disclosure system may significantly mitigate 
this risk by focusing disclosure on relevant information with 
predictive value. In the medical context, patients would likely 
prefer to work with a doctor with strong outcomes in a procedure 
even if a few other patients had filed complaints.252 
Despite pandering’s pejorative connotation, changing 
communication style and responsiveness may do significant good 
for clients. Attorney ethics rules generally require attorneys to 
communicate with clients and “promptly inform” them of “any 
decision or circumstance relevant to the client’s informed consent” 
and to “promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
information.”253 Poor communication does not only generate 
attorney complaints—it also violates the profession’s ethical 
rules.254 
                                                                                                     
 251. Supra Part I. 
 252. These predictive disclosures may also be required to obtain meaningful 
informed consent. See supra notes 206–207 and accompanying text (discussing 
informed consent in the medical context). 
 253. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
 254. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal 
Ethics, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1109 (2013) (“By perusing bar disciplinary records 
one would also learn about a myriad of less newsworthy but nonetheless 
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3. Strategic Client Selection 
Professionals may behave strategically in response to a 
disclosure system and refuse to do business with certain types of 
clients or patients. For example, physicians measured by patient 
outcomes, may decline to perform medical procedures on certain 
groups of patients if they may be more likely to experience 
complications that would mar a physician’s disclosure record. If 
many physicians behaved strategically, the best outcome rates 
could reflect a wealthy and relatively healthy patient population 
more than skill. Similarly, lawyers might opt against serving 
disfavored communities or out of practice areas to avoid 
complaints. 
An effective benchmarking system would mitigate the dangers 
posed by strategic client and patient selection. In the medical 
context, effective benchmarking means that the relevant 
benchmark would need to consider the physician’s patient 
population. Outcome statistics for physicians treating different 
populations should not be presented as fair comparisons. While 
generating more appropriate benchmarks would increase costs, 
the cost of information aggregation and analysis continues to 
decline rapidly, making effective benchmarking more feasible. 
Some behavioral changes might improve healthcare overall. 
At present, some physicians may reap financial rewards if a 
patient experiences complications because they will be required to 
perform additional medical procedures.255  
In the legal context, more strategic case selection might check 
frivolous litigation.256 Attorneys that file low-probability lawsuits 
                                                                                                     
important ethical violations—failure to communicate with clients, neglect of 
client matters, failure to provide competent representation, and misuse of client 
trust funds.”); see also Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox 
and Promise of Restorative Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 259–60 (2012) 
(reporting that the most common disciplinary complaints made against attorneys 
involve neglect and lack of communication). 
 255. Cf. Jonathan Baert Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk 
Management, 9 RISK 39, 49 (1998)  
To a provider paid on a fee-for-service basis, the iatrogenic side effects 
of initial treatment might constitute an unintentional source of 
additional revenues (up to the point that the iatrogenesis drives the 
patient to choose a different provider, or to expire), and such a provider 
would therefore have less financial incentive to prevent iatrogenesis. 
 256. See Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological 
1512 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1457 (2017) 
may not always internalize the costs their suits place on the 
public.257 Their clients may also not realistically assess the merits 
of their case and may assume that an attorney’s willingness to go 
forward indicates a reasonable probability of success. 
4. Statistical Barriers to Entry 
Freshly-minted professionals might object to this type of 
disclosure system because it may reduce the ability of newer 
professionals to attract initial clients. New professionals lack a 
record of outcomes that can be used. Here, it would be most 
appropriate to simply disclose that the professional is newly 
licensed. 
This does not mean that young professionals would not 
benefit. With a well-designed system, some populations of new 
professionals would rely on a firm’s reputation. These firm-specific 
disclosures would offer the most useful information to potential 
clients because the more senior professionals at that firm will be 
able to provide additional guidance and mentor the new 
professional. 
Of course, a new professional without any history and without 
a firm’s reputation to rely on might face some disadvantage 
because they are an unknown. This could create some market 
pressure for new professionals to affiliate with high-quality firms 
in their early years. On balance, that seems to be a good thing.  
Importantly, a disclosure regime would not lock new 
professionals out of the market. Even new solo practitioners 
without any information to disclose would likely benefit from 
improved disclosures in two ways. First, if a client knows that the 
new professionals want good outcomes to build their reputation, 
they may be willing to give new professionals a chance. The other 
benefit emerges from improved market function. If the disclosure 
system raises the level of practice and mitigates the lemon 
                                                                                                     
Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 185–86 (2000) (“For most litigants and attorneys 
in the trenches of the civil justice system, however, a frivolous case is simply a 
case in which the plaintiff has a low probability of prevailing at trial.”). 
 257. See supra Part I (discussing the negative externalities created by 
frivolous litigation). 
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problem, overall demand for legal services and the rational price 
to pay for an unknown goes up. 
B. Additional Implications 
Other considerations may also motivate the adoption of a 
Professional Prospectus system. 
1. Mitigating Implicit Bias 
Implicit bias plays a substantial role in how persons evaluate 
others.258 A well-meaning person that unknowingly associates 
professional competence with an image of an older white male may 
make suboptimal choices when selecting professional service 
providers by avoiding highly competent professionals that happen 
to be members of minority groups.259  
A Professional Prospectus system may counteract implicit bias 
by giving consumers more useful information about past outcomes. 
For example, a person with highly negative views toward minority 
racial groups might nonetheless elect to retain the services of a 
minority surgeon with 20% better outcomes than the average 
surgeon. When it comes to picking the person to perform a 
sensitive, high-stakes procedure, clients will likely seek the 
professional that offers a better probability. 
2. Facilitating Information Intermediaries 
A Professional Prospectus system would likely lower costs for 
information intermediaries to gather and analyze data. At present, 
a variety of private, for-profit firms provide lawyer rating 
                                                                                                     
 258. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: 
Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006) (“[T]he science of implicit 
cognition suggests that actors do not always have conscious, intentional control 
over the processes of social perception, impression formation, and judgment that 
motivate their action.”). 
 259. Cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and 
Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 485 (2007) (“Whatever it 
reflects, implicit bias can result in behaviors and evaluations that limit the 
opportunities of minority group members.”). 
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services.260 By standardizing disclosures and making information 
more public, these organizations will likely face lower costs for 
compiling and creating recommendations.  
These intermediaries may play a vital role in amplifying the 
benefits of a Professional Prospectus regime by providing regularly 
updated rankings and indicia of quality. Consumers entering a 
market may use these services to select professionals—
significantly mitigating the lemon problem and allowing higher 
quality professionals to earn returns.  
3. Best Practices 
A Professional Prospectus system may cause professionals to 
more quickly adopt best practices. In a competitive market, 
professionals winning the highest marks on disclosure forms will 
become model practitioners. Once the most effective practices are 
identified, many other practitioners will likely alter their practices 
to obtain the same results. Broad release of the information may 
also affect human capital flows because ambitious young 
professionals will prefer to join professional firms with superior 
scores. 
This knowledge transfer might happen through different 
mechanisms. Professionals with poorer outcomes might now lack 
comparative information that could show that they could achieve 
gains by changing their practices. A disclosure system could 
provide useful information to them and nudge them toward 
improving outcomes. In group practice settings, shared 
accountability would likely increase mentoring and knowledge 
transfer within firms. 
V. Conclusion 
Although occupational licensing and professional 
self-regulation provide one solution for regulating professional 
services markets, this Article calls for a blended approach that 
amplifies reputational forces. While consumers may not be able to 
                                                                                                     
 260. See Renee Newman Knake, The Commercialization of Legal Ethics, 29 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 715, 719 (2016) (discussing lawyer rating services). 
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evaluate professional services directly, relevant information does 
emerge over time. In many instances, relevant information is 
already public and either available on a webpage or with a routine 
request for access to information. 
The public often struggles to perform even basic due diligence 
on professionals because they are often one-shot players in the 
system. Almost by definition, one-shot players face staggering 
search and analysis costs for information because they do not know 
the range of information available or how to identify the most 
valuable information. 
Pushing appropriately tailored information out to consumers 
at initial points of contact should improve overall market 
functioning in multiple ways. It will make it easier for consumers 
to avoid the least competent professionals and increase the 
business flowing to more competent professionals. If the system 
functions well, underserved market segments may see 
significantly more activity. If the system makes only modest 
improvements, it may still generate public benefits worth the cost. 
Relatively minor efficiency gains in massive markets generate 
sizeable benefits.  
Ultimately, the concept has broad applicability. While this 
Article suggests that immigration court practice could provide an 
initial use case, other administrative courts might also be able to 
implement similar schemes. As statistical information about 
outcomes associated with individual professionals becomes more 
readily available, a move to increased disclosure seems likely to 
happen. The best professionals will push for disclosure because of 
the economic rewards for their skills. The least competent may face 
increasing litigation alleging a lack of informed consent. 
